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THE NOVELTY OF LATIN AMERICA:  
GLOBALIZATIONS, FUTURES, AND NATIONS* 
PART I 
“We have now sunk to a depth where the restatement of the obvious 
is our duty” George Orwell 
Abstract: This essay argues that Latin America created a 
modern cutting edge design of the nation and national identity long 
before Europe. In many aspects, it was more modern than the United 
States. The region is seen as a modernizer and globalizer rather than 
a mere recipient of influences. In light of these findings, the essay 
revisits theories of the Nation, National Identity, Modernization and 
Globalization. Most literature on the construction of national identity 
and nationalism focuses on communal past experiences and history 
to explain the nation. Rather, I claim that a different dimension and 
intellectual construct, ‘the future of the nation’, provides one of the 




* The views and opinions expressed in this essay are the author’s alone, and do 
not represent those of the Universidad Del CEMA. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Latin America as a Modernizer 
The novelty of Latin America is significant and has gone largely 
unnoticed. Many factors have contributed to such neglect, not the 
least of which are prejudice, lack of information about its modernity, 
and the strong influence of Anglo-American literature which has 
ignored the region both as a definer of modernity and globalization. In 
Modernization, World Systems, Dependency, and International 
Relations theory, Latin America is portrait as a receptor rather than as 
a producer of modernity and a poor contributor to the consolidation of 
the modern West. Because in these theories Latin America is 
conceived as a part of a larger periphery roughly ranked in terms of 
degrees of development or political stability, their arguments have 
missed the innovative role played by the area in processes of 
modernization. And yet the region has been a modernizer and a 
‘globalizer’.  
A very important contribution of Latin America to the process of 
modernity and globalization has been its cutting edge construction of 
national identity and the nation, in connection with the crafting of 
nation-states under Republican arrangements. All these 
developments marked, among others, the consolidation of modernity 
in the West and elsewhere.  To view them as such changes, in many 
ways, our conception of modernity and our understanding of 
globalization. Their importance for the re-formulation of theories of 
modernity and globalization will be discussed below. Their novelty  
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and impact globally were great, and this can be seen when one 
compares them with similar processes taking place in the Old World. 
United by common ethnicities, languages, and history, nations were 
part of the European landscape long before the sixteenth century. 
Most of them lived, for centuries, under the ruling of the same state, 
e.g., empires, protectorates, or kingdoms. The advent of the modern 
world marked a shift toward the emergence of smaller states. These 
ruled over lesser number of nations, until the one state-one nation 
formula became the rule rather than the exception. This took more 
than a century. During the first wave of globalization (1870-1920) this 
process acquired global dimensions and advanced faster, especially 
as a result of WWI.   
As we shall see, Europe and Latin America represent very different 
and yet complementary processes of nation-state formation; both of 
them contribute to our understanding of modernity and both of them 
should be taken as examples of the complexities of globalization. 
Since the late eighteenth century in Europe large states started to 
shrink as nations sought to live under smaller states that, supposedly, 
represented their interests better. Nations tended to precede the state 
(Germany) although examples of states making their own nations 
also emerged in Europe (France).  In either case, the one state-one 
nation formula and Republican rule were exceptional. In Latin 
America, contrastingly, the modern one state-one nation formula was 
established from the beginning. And, despite the early hesitation of 
countries like Mexico which remained for a short while loyal to 
Fernando VII, in Latin America and after Independence Republican  
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arrangements were quickly established as the norm. One can easily 
argue that the region was, in terms of the requirements of modernity 
as accepted by the paradigms of the time, more avant-garde and 
modern.  In Europe, nations try to create or contribute to construct 
their own states; in Latin America, the state created, for the most part, 
the nation. Native American nations and identities were rapidly 
transformed, eliminated, or segregated, despite the fact that the 
emerging states were weak. As we shall soon see, these processes 
of nation making are seldom compared; nonetheless, they do 
contribute to a better understand both modernity and globalization.   
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ruling 
elites in Latin America tried hard to glue state and nation together. 
The nation-state formula found in Latin America its strongest support; 
worldwide; the region hosted the largest number of republics and 
nation-states featuring the one nation-one state modern model. One 
can argue that during the first wave of globalization Latin America 
tried to create a strong link between the state and the nation, a nation 
that, still in construction, was nonetheless conceived as a unit and in 
tandem with the state. As this book will show, the one state-one 
nation model was ravaged by strong tensions from its beginnings. 
What is in fact remarkable is that it lasted as long as it has. As it has 
been noticed, modernity is usually unstable precisely because its 
dynamics create rapid change, maladjustments, and especially in this 
case, tensions between state and nation. Latin America is a living 
proof.    
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During the present wave of globalization, the glue that held 
together state and nation seems to be melting. This is one of the 
most remarkable events of twentieth first century globalization. And it 
must be understood both as part of globalization and the overall, the 
evolution of Latin American modernity. A modernity that, curiously 
enough, may come back full circle to the old one state-many nations 
model that dominated Europe before WWI.  The cases of Ecuador, 
Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, Guatemala, and Paraguay, where 
different cultural identities and nations are now challenging the one 
state-one nation formula presents an opposite scenario when 
compared with today’s Europe. In the Old World and during the 
present wave of globalization the one state-one nation formula has 
grown stronger than ever. This is also true globally. Nation-states 
have, indeed, multiplied worldwide in recent years. While by the 
beginning of the 1980s we had 156 states, by the opening of the 
1990s we could already count 163.  At the time of writing we have 
187 states in the global system with Asia, Africa and Europe having 
the largest numbers (49, 54, and 48 respectively). 
1 Therefore, Latin 
America pioneered a modern model of the nation-state that long after, 
especially during the second wave of globalization, has expanded 
globally. Below, I will argue that Latin America’s design of the nation, 
or at least the design of the nation that most of the region adopted 
and which was crafted during the first wave of globalization, 
                                            
1 Many nation-states are of very recent data: in the 1980s seven were created 
and in the 1990s twenty three new states emerged. Others are not still full-fledged 
states, and still others have failed in their attempt to unify and centralize power. Failed 
states remain a minority within the global system. 
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introduces a very important, largely unnoticed variable in our 
theorizing about the nation and national identity.  
This was a modular notion of the nation in which the 
construction of the future, as a building bloc, was as important as 
history, common ethnicity, race or language.  Images of a future of 
progress and prosperity for the nation dominated the imaginary of 
elites and citizens alike, to the point of constituting a central part of its 
definition. The “emotional attachment” that so many since Max Weber 
have argued to be a necessary condition of nation building, finds a 
fundamental source of strength in the future, rather than the past.  
“Imagining” the nation in this particular way, to use a terminology 
made popular by Benedict Anderson, calls for a correction of current 
literature. Most writings on the subject attribute an overwhelming 
importance to history, past group experiences, and the past in 
general when forging the nation and conceptualizing it; this book 
claims that the future is, at least, as important.   
As we shall see in Part II, this conceptualization of the nation in 
which future developments weighed as much as the past, was 
intricately connected with globalization. From the late 1860s to the 
1920s changes in paradigms, the rise and fall of international powers, 
the revolution experienced by the arts, changes in culture and 
scientific research, advances in communication technology and 
immigration, contributed to shape and conceptualize the nation. An 
interaction of factors that closely resembled what many regions of the 
word are experiencing today, at the end of the first decade of the 
twentieth first century  
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Is the question of modernity important? The  tendency to find 
post-modernity behind every single instance in which modernization 
appears to be challenged or transformed, has blinded many scholars 
and observers to the fact that most of the features of our 
contemporary world remain, by en large, modern. This is especially 
true in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East; indeed, Latin 
America today has been seen as a “third phase” of modernity.
2 And 
this is also true, although often forgotten, of most of Europe and 
North America. Thus, our present is still strongly connected with the 
process that we call “modernity”. Latin America is a misinterpreted 
piece in theories of modernity. If this is true, and I claim it is, then we 
lack a comprehensive theory of Modernity. As we shall see, also 
Globalization theory can, in part, be found guilty of similar charges.   
What about post-modernity? Post-modernity is still to impose 
itself over the modern dominant features of our world. In a sort of 
Hegelian “dialectical” relation with modernity, post-modernity has 
been thought of as the “negation” of what is modern. Yet the 
deconstruction of modern structures has been so far only timorous 
and weak. The very idea of “cycles” that would begin and end –as in 
Nietzsche, Hegel, or Toynbee-- is problematic. Empirical evidence, 
however, shows that, in Latin America and most other areas of the 
world our present reality reflects ongoing modernizing processes that 
are, so to speak, not yet “finished”. The modern transformations that 
                                            
2 One argument has been to consider Latin America as a “third phase of modernity”. For 
a good discussion on this point, see Domingues, Jose Mauricio “Social Theory, Latin 
America, and Modernity” in Gerard Delanty, ed., Handbook of European Social Theory, 
London, Sage, 2005.  
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took hold of the Latin America and the Iberian world during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are still at work today.  
A discussion of national identity and the nation connects with 
modernity and therefore with one of its utmost products, the nation-
state.  Curiously enough, literatures on the state and the nation have 
grown separate, almost challenging the modern idea that the nation-
state meant an intimate relation between the two. As a result, we do 
not possess a real comparative theory of the nation-state.  Albeit 
some exceptions, for the most part the connection between the two 
has somehow been lost. An obvious exception seems to be 
Hobsbawam’s work on the rise of nationalism and the formation of 
European nations. Yet his seminal contribution is definitely focused 
on nationalism rather than the nation or national identity. These are 
similar but not identical concepts. In addition, his main objective is not 
to formulate a comprehensive theory of the connection between the 
modern nation and the modern state.
 3  Similarly, in Charles Tilly’s 
extensive work on the European nation-state we find an important 
and pertinent discussion. But Tilly’s main focus was the state, rather 
than the nation or the connection between the two. 
We definitely know more about the state than about the nation-
state. And while we have produced comparative work on the state we 
still lack comparative work on the nation and national identity. Some 
                                            
3  Hobsbawam, Eric J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. 
Cambridge, University Press, 1990;  “Inventing Tradition” in Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, 
The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp 1-14, and we find also 
a discussion on sates and nations in Hobsbawm, Eric, The Age of Empire, 1875-1914, 
New York, Vintage Books, 1989.  
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recent comparative work on the state in Latin America, for instance, 
has concentrated on the state rather than the nation.
4  Institutions 
and the state bureaucracy have been systematically dissected since 
the eighteenth century. We have done research on the institutional 
arrangements and bureaucracies that make power centralization 
possible and have extensively studied the production of public policy. 
Of late, good efforts have been made to place Latin America in the 
context of philosophical and political theorizing about the state.
5  A 
comparative theory of the nation-state, however, is still under 
construction.  
Of course the literature on the nation, national identity, and 
nationalism is overwhelming.  Studies with a focus on Latin America, 
however, have been country-oriented and non-comparative, with a 
tendency to identify national identity with specific cultures, domestic 
historical developments, or home grown ideas about what is “ours” in 
contraposition with what is “foreigner”. The connection between the 
nation and the state has been made, but loosely and with little, it 
seem, theoretical implications. Many times, in fact, the differentiation 
between the nation and the state has been left in the dark, and 
literature talks about both as if they were a unit of analysis.  In the 
                                            
4  I am myself guilty of the same thing. And so are other colleagues who have offered 
welcome comparative work on the state in Latin America and Europe. See Fernando 
Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810-1920, Duke 
University Press, 2000, and Centeno, Miguel Angel, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation 
State in Latin America. The Pennsylvania University Press, 2002.  
     
5 See, for instance,  the  work of  Agustin E. Ferraro, Reinventando el Estado: Por una 
adminsitracion publica democratica y professional en Iberoamerica,Instituto Nacional de 
Administracion Publica, Madrid, 2009.  
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overall literature on the nation and nationalism for the most part the 
connection between state and nation has been at the margins of 
theorizing. There are, of course, exceptions.
 6 One can argue, 
however, that overall these two growing bodies of literature (on the 
state, on the nation) have hardly dialogued with each other.  
There is consensus that nation and state are not the same. One 
is composed of institutions of governance; the other, is, for most 
authors, a community of sentiment. In liberal thinking and most 
contractual theories of the state the latter has been understood as a 
special community possessing a right to sovereignty and statehood. 
A nation has that right because its members are bound by obligations 
that “should be enforced as political obligations”. And obviously you 
need the institutions of the state to achieve that. National identity can 
be interpreted as the bond that ties members to that special 
community called the nation. Or, to the specific portrait of that 
community called “nation” in the minds of those who are assumed to 
be its members. Membership in the nation no doubt does impose 
special kinds of obligations.
7 Conversely, a state becomes legitimate 
in part because of its status as a national state, that is, one entitled to 
                                            
6  See, for instance, Florencia Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial 
Mexico and Peru, University of California Press, 1995.  The work of Thurner, Mark, also 
on Peru. From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Post-Colonial State 
Making in Andean Peru, Durham. Duke University Press, 1997 focuses on national 
identity in one case, Peru. Yet these books concentrate more on the formation of identity 
and fractured identities than on the dialogue between theories of identity and theories of 
state making.   
  
7 For further discussion on these points see, for instance, Guiberneau, Monserrat, 
Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, 
Polity, 1996, p 43 and passim, and Guilbert, Paul, The Philosophy of Nationalism, 
Westview Press, 1998, pp. 20-22.   
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the loyalty of its nationals. Despite all these linkages between state 
and nation, literature on the nation has been written, in general, from 
anthropological and sociological standpoints that do not encourage a 
dialogue with theories of the state.  
Some have argued that the nation, the state, nationalism, and 
even patriotism indicate similar phenomena. In 1966 Morton 
Grodzins, analyzing the relation between individuals and nations, 
wrote that “there is delight in attaching one’s self to a larger cause. 
Inner doubts are dissipated because the cause give purpose and 
direction to life…The mechanism is one of identification: of accepting 
the nations’ symbols and achievements as one own, of feeling 
personal satisfaction as a consequence of institutional 
accomplishment. This identification is fostered because the nation 
directly satisfies personal needs by governmental programs that more 
and more tend to touch more and more people…the nation are 
looked upon as a good in itself.”
8  
For Grodzins, as for others, the emotional attachment to the 
nation is almost one and the same with the benefits citizens receive 
when attaching themselves to state institutions which distribute 
common goods, which also strengthens patriotism and sharpens 
nationalism. The nation and the state (or government), are part of the 
same social-institutional development.  This is a practical position that 
explains somehow the connection between states and citizens. Yet it 
                                            
8 Grodzins, Morton. The Loyal and the Disloyal: Social Boundaries of Patriotism and 
Treason. Meridian Books, World Publishing Company, 1966, p. 21 
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ignores the linkages that exist between international variables, nation 
building, and state formation. It also misses the importance of images 
and conceptions of the national that after the eighteenth century do 
not necessarily coincide, in the minds of both the ruled and the rulers, 
with that of the state and its institutions of government.   
In addition, loyalties to the nation can be different from loyalties 
to the state.  Connor, for instance, insists that “A nation, then, is 
neither a state, nor the population of a state …. Nationalism emerges 
as an identification with, and loyalty to, the nation, nor with or to the 
state. Loyalty to the state has traditionally being called patriotism.”  
Connor conceptualizes the difference thus: “A current vogue is to 
differentiate the two loyalties …as ethnic nationalism and civic 
nationalism respectively. But using the same noun, nationalism, is 
misleading because it nourishes the misconception that we are 
dealing with two variations of the same phenomenon.”
9   
Connor’s suggestion is clarifying. Nationalism, however, the 
love of the nation, is a different notion altogether. The nation, national 
identity, and nationalism are not the same. Nationalism is mostly 
defined as a movement and/or an ideology that both shapes and 
defends the nation. For Erik Hobsbawam nationalism in fact can 
create the nation. He defines the nation as a new “entity” which is “no 
older than the eighteen century”.
10 Nationalism, the defense of what 
                                            
9 Walker Connor, “The Dawning of Nations”, in Ichijo and Uzelac, eds. When is the 
Nation? Routledge, 2005, p 40. 
  
10  Hobsbawam, Erik, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. 
Cambridge, University Press, 1990, p. 3 and page 9.  
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is “ours”, preceded it. “The nation, as conceived by nationalism, can 
be recognized prospectively; the real nation can only be recognized a 
posteriori”.
11   In other words, nationalism can become the conceptual 
crafter of the nation, and the nation can be recognized as such only 
after the former has molded it.  Nationalism, however conceived, 
usually leads to collective action, the formation of movements of 
defense of the nation, and so forth. I am not interested in a discussion 
of nationalism here. Rather, my focus is on how members –and at 
times non-members-- conceptualize the nation and the formation of 
national identity.   
Figure 1 represents the differences among these concepts, and 
shows the “ingredients” that modern Latin America used in forging the 
nation and national identity. Image s of the future of the nation rank 
as a major and necessary factor in nation making; the 
conceptualization of the national community mostly precedes 
nationalism but the relation goes both ways. The reason is that in 
Latin America the state took precedent in the crafting of the nation but 
nationalism, simply as a reaction against Spain during the ward of 
Independence, already existed although as a poorly articulated 
phenomenon.  
 
                                                                                                                                  
 
11 Ibid. p 9. See also his discussion in pp 10-12.   
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Many times the nation and national identity are based on 
national histories created by the state and/or nationalism. Myths are 
no doubt important. Historical myths, symbols, and liturgy are part of 
the definition of the nation. They can also provide both the inspiration 
and content of nationalism. Sheldon Wolin tells us that “collectivities 
take shape historically, that is, as a matter of fact; but they come into 
being mythically….Their main purpose is to fix certain meanings 
about matters that are alleged to be fundamental because they 
pertain to the identity and flourishing of the whole society.”
12 We can 
                                            
12 Wolin, Sheldon S. The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the 
Constitution. Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, pp 1-2. 
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say that states in Latin America and Europe made enormous efforts 
to “fix” those meanings. Yet this alone does not provide an adequate 
explanation of the nation. First, myths can also be about the future, 
and these can be as important as those about the past. Second, 
myths are not exclusively home grown. They can also reflect 
international influences.  
In short, one of this book’s goals is to establish a stronger 
dialogue between modernization and globalization theories in 
reference to the construction of the nation and national identity. 
Indeed, the nation and national identity are products of modernization 
and, as such, should not be studied in isolation from theories of 
modernity and the state. A macro picture of nation building and 
national identity should include an integrated discussion on 
modernity, state building, and globalization. A number of theories of 
globalization have mentioned national identity and nation building as 
one of many changes affecting states and regions of the global 
system; the discussion, however, has been so far scattered and 
comparative theories on these changes still in the making.  In the 
case of Latin America most literature has focused, rather, on the state 
reform and neo-liberalism. 
13   
                                            
13  Curiously enough, studies on Latin America from a globalization theory perspective 
are still a minority within the large literature we have on the region. They have ranged 
from political economy, cultural, or institutional perspectives, to simply surveying the 
“reactions” of the region in response to globalization. In other words, the emphases have 
widely varied and the topics have differed, forming an eclectic although valuable 
collection.  Among others, see Fernando Lopez-Alves and Diane Johnson, (ed.) 
Globalization and Uncertainty in Latin America, Praeger/Mcmillan, 2007;  Robinson, 
William I. Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change, and Globalization,  
London: Verso, 2003;  Chudnovsky,  Daniel.  “Beyond Macroeconomic Stability in Latin  
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A second point is to contribute to change the way we think 
about the nation and national identity, introducing the future as a 
constructing block of the nation. As we shall see, the use of the future 
in Latin America is novel and modern, and differs from the sense of 
mission or predetermination that characterized the United States. 
While the first Republic gained a very important place as a source of 
inspiration for Latin American nation makers, the final use of the 
future as a variable in the construction of the nation in both parts of 
the Americas widely differed. My third goal is to offer a correction to 
the way literature theorizes about Latin America, showing the region 
as a modernizer and globalizer rather than as a mere receptor of and 
reactor to global influence. Before further examining the nation and 
national identity, we need to start by briefly discussing the modern 
nation-state formula. 
One State, One Nation: Latin America and Europe 
A host of institutions have been identified with modernity: party 
systems, regular elections, republicanism, the predominance of 
democracy, liberalism and, for others, the stronger states of socialism 
and communism, etc. The list is enormous and not consensual. One 
institution, however, has been regarded as the foremost sign of 
                                                                                                                                  
America”. In John H.Dunning and Khalil A. Hamdani (ed.) The New Globalism and 
Developing Countries, pp 125-154.  New York, United  Nations University Press, 1997;  
G. M. Joseph (et al.) Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.- 
Latin American Relations, Duke University Press, 1999;  Boron, Atilio, El Buho de 
Minerva Buenos Aires:  Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2000;  Gwynne, Robert N. And 
Cristobal Kay, (ed) Latin America Transformed: Globalization and Modernity, London, 
Arnold, 1999;   Lopez-Alves, Fernando, Sociedades Sin Destino: Latin America tiene lo 
que se merece? Buenos Aires, Taurus/ Santillana, 2002;   William C. Smith and Roberto 
Patricio Korzeniewicz, eds. Politics, Social Change, and Economic Restructuring in Latin 
America, Boulder, CO: North-South Center Press and Lynne Reinner Books, 1997.  
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modernity: the emergence of the nation-state. As many have shown, 
its construction has been all along a key aspect of modernity.
14 And 
its reform has become a key focus of globalization theory.  
As indicated, while nations and identity are constructs 
connected to modernity, communities united by define identities can 
also be argued to precede the smaller, modern states. People have 
lived much longer under empires than under nation-states, and in 
most empires they lived as members of many “national” communities. 
Nevertheless, toward the end of the eighteenth century nation-states 
started to become the rule rather than the exception. That is, the one 
state, one nation model slowly gained predominance. Latin America 
represents a very important part of this global process. In Europe, 
political and identity boundaries tended to coincide with ethno 
linguistic boundaries that were not easily erasable. One of the great 
novelties of the French Revolution was to create the notion of 
voluntary membership into the nation; thus, citizenship. In the Old 
World this notion progressed with enormous difficulties. Yet from the 
onset in the Americas it provided the theoretical foundation of most 
newly created states.  
                                            
14 See, for instance, Charles Tilly Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–
1990.  Cambridge, MA:  Blackwell, 1990.  and also his   European Revolutions, 1492–
1992.  Cambridge, MA:  Blackwell, 1993. The same definition is present in Michael 
Mann, States, War and Capitalism:  Studies in Political Sociology.  Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell 1988. See also the same concept at work in Fernando Lopez-Alves, State 
Formation and Democracy in Latin America, Duke University Press, 2000. Landes, 
David, in his The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are Rich and Some So 
Poor, New York, W.W. Norton and Company, 1999, also sees the nation-state as a sign 
of modernity.  
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Modernization and Liberalism promoted this one state-one 
nation equation, that is, a state for each nation rather than many 
nations living under the same state  --as it had been historically the 
case in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.  Often ignored in terms of 
its relation with the state, the forging of nations becomes a crucial 
feature of modernity. As E. Kamenka puts it: “Since kings were to 
cease governing and the ‘people’ were to take their place, people had 
to be mould into some sort of unity, defined and limited in some sort 
of way. The concept of ‘nation’ thus came to the fore as a 
fundamental political category.”
15  Where does Latin America fit in the 
process of modernization and the construction of modern institutions 
like the nation-state and national identity?   
From the standpoint of the core countries that dominated the 
global system of the nineteenth century, Latin America remained a 
distant “uncivilized” and conflictive region. Yet from the standpoint of 
the paradigm of modernity, the new republics represented something 
very different.  In the agenda of the dominant liberal doctrine of the 
time, they would classify as avant-garde examples of modern 
institution building. Compare with Europe. There, authoritarian, 
aristocratic, and imperial forms of rule were alive and well. In Latin 
America, instead, elites had no choice but to innovate and experiment 
with new and modern forms of governance. Europe remained tied to 
its traditions and old institutions and during the sweeping changes 
                                            
15 Kamenka Eugene  “Political Nationalism: The Evolution of the Idea” in E. Kamenka 
(ed.) Political Nationalism: the Evolution of an Idea, Australia National University Press, 
Canberra, 1973, p 10 
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brought about by modernization states were less free to innovate. 
Indeed, many of them maintained the one state-many nations’ model. 
Europe’s advantage was that if threatened by change it could resort 
to its past and traditions, choosing from a wider arrange of possible 
types of regimes and institutions of government. The return to old 
monarchical rule, empire, or other forms of traditional aristocratic rule 
remained always a possibility, as France, Austria, Germany or Italy 
illustrate. A disadvantage for Europe --and an important difference 
with Latin America-- was that in Europe old strong national identities 
tended to clash with one another, presenting serious problems to the 
states that ruled over them.  
Tied by common ethnicity, race, language, and strong shared 
history national communities were a mighty presence in the modern 
European landscape. No state seemed able to avoid their conflictive 
relations or to decrease their power. The nation-state model came in 
comparison ‘late’ to most of Europe. It was in 1918, after WWI was 
over and when the three traditional monarchies of East and Central 
Europe came to an end, that the formula was implemented at a grand 
scale. In Latin America, the modern design of the one state-one 
nation dominated from the early nineteenth century on. While I am 
not claiming that this was a better way to unite institutions of 
government with the communities over which they rule, I am claiming 
that it was part of the accepted package of modernity at the time.  
When at the end of WWI in Europe the Habsburgs and the 
Hohenzollerns were gone and the Romanovs had already been 
murdered and buried in a nameless grave during the Russian  
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Revolution, the dominant one state-many nations formula fell out of 
grace. The Sultan in Turkey, another large state that also housed 
many nations, was also debunked that year, although a Turkish 
Republic was not proclaimed until 1922. 
Modern times meant, among other things, that nations that had 
been assembled together for centuries under the same rulers were 
now free to try to establish their own states. How many nations did 
these empires assemble? By the end of WWI the Habsburg Empire 
housed twelve different communities identified as “nations”. In 1887, 
the Russian census showed  that only 43% or the total population 
under the Romanovs were Russians; the rest claimed to be Swedish, 
Germans, Kurdish Muslims, Catholic Poles, Orthodox Latvians, and 
so forth; by 1926, there were still 200 different nationalities and 
languages in the former Soviet Union. The Hohenzollern’s Empire 
was more homogeneous, but still housed large minorities of Poles, 
Alsatians, French, and Danes.
16  
The long history of the one state many nations model proved 
conflictive. Globalization did not help to sustain it.  In the midst of the 
first wave of globalization and the intense process of modernization 
that started in the 1870s still Europe went to war. In fact, the century 
that started in 1900 was going to be the bloodiest on record, in 
relative as well as in absolute terms. More people were killed in the 
two World Wars than in any prior century, with the Second World War 
                                            
16 Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties, Harper 
Perennial, New York, 1991, pp19-21.   
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standing as the most terrible man-made catastrophe in human 
history.  The one-nation one state model in a non-industrial setting 
like Latin America seems to have produced a much more peaceful 
twentieth century. The region did engage in civil wars and revolution. 
The Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), and the Cuban and 
Nicaraguan revolutions are the most well-known. Bolivia may very 
well qualify as member of this group as well. There have also been 
important conflicts between governments and rural and urban 
guerrillas in Salvador, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Argentina, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay, and Brazil. Whether some of these 
conflicts express tensions between nations and their own state will be 
discussed below; but at any rate, war among states has not been a 
part of this landscape.    
Again, since early nineteenth century Latin America stuck to the 
modern one state-one nation formula and to republicanism. Given the 
ethnic, racial, and cultural diversity of a region where native identities 
were still alive and had started to thrive again, perhaps a more 
expedient formula would have been the one state-many nations’ 
model. In fact, the modern chosen formula was harder to implement 
than it had been in the First Republic, the United States, where 
Native Americas had not built large and powerful civilizations like 
those found by the Spaniards in Latin America.  In the Americas, and 
unlike Europe, states in formation constructed the nation. And unlike 
the Old Word, they seriously struggled to strengthen and maintain the 
modern link between one nation and one state. Again, was this 
formula less costly in terms of conflict? Was it easier to maintain  
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when whole communities who did not have access to the new power 
system resisted it? The answer is that it was not. Still, as we shall 
see, in their modernizing republican obsession, most elites followed 
this model and did not seriously consider other options.   
In the 1920s Max Weber, following the modern conception of 
the nation-state, concluded that the nation was “a community of 
sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; 
hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a 
state of its own”. Notice that Weber, following the German experience 
with state building, believed the nation (the community of solidarity 
and language to which the German people belonged before Bismarck 
united them under one state) to preexist the state. Nations, in this 
tradition, make their own states, rather than the other way round.
 17  
Italy or Russia can be viewed in a similar light. Contrastingly, in Latin 
America from the onset the state produced the nation. Or, better put, 
state and nation emerged at the same time. This simple fact, offers a 
rich and useful comparative angle to better understand modernity.    
In terms of the implementation of the one state one nation 
formula, modernization in Europe resurged again after the fall of the 
Soviet Union when nations that wished to have their own state 
claimed independence.
18  Nations in Eastern Europe and parts of 
Central Asia declared to be autonomous countries with their own 
                                            
17 For further discussion on these points see, for instance, Guiberneau, Monserrat, 
Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, 
Polity, 1996, p 43 and passim, and Guilbert, Paul, The Philosophy of Nationalism, 
Westview Press, 1998, pp. 20-22.   
18 The European Union does not undermine this move toward the one state-one nation 
model; in fact, the nation-state constitutes its fundamental unit  
  23 
territories and laws. Modernization, rather than Globalization, in a 
way, gave these nations the right to possess their own institutions of 
government.  Contrastingly, indigenous communities in Latin America 
that shared common ethnicities, languages, races, or institutions, 
weakened progressively under Spanish colonial rule. Yet it was after 
independence that they were really debunked as possible national 
actors. Modernization weakened these communities. Unlike stronger 
states in the Old World, the weak republics of Latin America, 
therefore, were able to marginalize and segregate these 
communities, denying them the status of nations and blocking their 
participation in a larger nation created from above.  
 One major reason why nation building was a priority for the 
new states was that, among other things, they desperately needed 
legitimacy. This need for legitimacy, a typical product of modernity, 
rested upon the loyalty that glued members of a nation to the state. 
Immediately after independence Latin America states possessed no 
nations, or, better put, they did not possess the nations that they 
wished to have. Unlike Europe, modern nations and national identity 
had to be created almost “from scratch”. A sort of white European 
tabula rasa had to be created to exclude, for the most part, Native 
Americans and other groups from the desired nation. Or so thought a 
majority among the ruling elites thorough the region, who wanted to 
make ruling easier and “modernize” their societies.  In this modern 
arrangement the nation, sponsored and shaped by the state, would 
provide the needed legitimacy. Since the 16
th century Spain also tells 
the story of a state painfully trying to construct a loyal nation. What is  
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surprising in comparing these processes of modernization is the 
relative slow progress of the Spanish State/Catholic Church nation 
building effort when compared with the results obtained by weaker 
republican states in its ex-colonies. 
All states have to multitask. Yet these weaker states --in 
comparison with European states or even the Federal State in the 
United States—were forced to multitask to a higher degree. 
Modernity can come out of weaknesses. These modern nation-states 
started as poor and dependent, with low autonomy and capacity, with 
scrawny and unorganized armies, with inefficient bureaucracies, with 
economies destroyed by war.
19 As they were changing during the first 
wave of globalization (circa 1870-1920) and they confronted strong 
opposition in the regions they were forced to construct new 
international diplomatic and trade networks, especially with those 
countries that “mattered”. While building the nation, they had to 
improve their image in the eyes of an increasingly demanding 
international context that, for some good reasons, perceived them as 
corrupt and far from modern. Not to mention the “accommodation” of 
different ethnicities, identities, and cultures into the one state one 
nation mold. Their final success was relative; they left a legacy of 
                                            
19 When the modern state emerged in Latin America, it inherited devastated post-war 
economies. It could be argued that until the early decades of the twentieth century none 
of the newly formed states possessed a fully functioning economy, or the capacity to 
develop a sound taxation system or efficiently penetrate the regions. See Centeno, 
Miguel Angel Blood and Debt: War and the Nation State in Latin America. The 
Pennsylvania University Press, 2002.  See as well Fernando Lopez-Alves, State 
Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1800-1900, Duke University Press, 2000. 
Many of these weaknesses have continued to characterize these states up until the 
present time. 
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instability that is still with us today. And yet they were operating under 
very definite ideas of modernity that shaped both state and nation.   
My point is that in Latin America the construction of the modern 
nation-state faced a number of domestic and international pressures 
that state makers in Western Europe or in the United States did not 
confront.
20  Nowhere else, perhaps with the exception of the First 
Republic --although some have argued that in the US the nation 
preceded the state—can we find a clearer picture of the modern state 
and nation rising almost at the same time.
21 In part, the picture we 
have painted brings us to what takes place in the region during the 
second wave of globalization, especially in terms of state reform and 
the redefinition of the nation and national identity. The regions’ 
capacity for absorbing modern international standards, a legacy of 
the first wave of globalization, has become a constant over time.
22  
This capacity, however, should not be confused with a mere imitation 
of modernity created elsewhere.    
   Industrialization, which Latin America lacked and Europe and 
the U.S. possessed, is not, in isolation, a good indicator of modernity. 
In Europe, industrialization transformed and modernized society at 
many different levels. Yet many stubborn aristocratic and centralizing 
institutions persisted, not to mention imperial ambitions which were, 
                                            
20 We will discuss the major differences between modernity in the US and Latin America 
shortly below.  
 
21 Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge. Harvard University 
Press, 1992 
 
22 In the 1990s, external factors combined with domestic ones as strongly as they did in 
the first wave. Again at that time the region enthusiastically adopted international 
standards (neoliberalism, open markets, etc.).  
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in part, fueled by industrialization, new technologies, and 
improvements in communications. In the U.S, the industrializing effort 
did help modernization but it was not fully at work when in the 
eighteenth century the modern institutions of the first republic were 
sketched and put to work. Also resembling Europe in the 1600s, Latin 
American states in the nineteenth century adopted a strategy of 
agrarian development that included mining and the commercialization 
of agriculture. It was in this context that its pioneer modern institutions 
emerged. Latin America remained behind in the industrial race, but 
this did not stop it from constructing modernity.  As we shall see in 
Part II, the result was not a carbon copy of other Western regions. In 
the popular imaginary of the new nations the United States took a 
very important place as a model, but its different economy, society (s) 
and grand power ambitions made it a difficult example to follow. 
Europe could not be taken as a serious modern reference either: 
most countries were monarchical, imperialist, or simple followed 
aristocratic forms of rule alien to the modern way. Therefore, 
innovation was needed.  
When Argentina celebrated its first centenary, it represented 
perhaps and unbalanced but novel and advanced experiment in the 
world of her time.
23 In fact, as early as the 1820s Bernardino 
Rivadavia in Argentina had introduced advanced political reforms that 
will have to wait for another two decades to be considered seriously 
in Europe.  President Lopez Pumarejo of Colombia pressed for 
                                            
23  See the report by the Argentine Commission of the Panama-Pacific Exposition.  1915.  
The Argentine Republic.  San Francisco:  Panama Pacific Exposition  
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similar reform in the 1850s, before the coffee boom took roots and 
Barrington Moore’s notion of the “commercialization of agriculture” 
started to make sense. The modern program of the May Revolution in 
Argentina and the Bolivarian agenda had been the topic of much 
discussion. The twentieth century added modernity. By 1910, 
Uruguay embodied an innovative and interesting experiment of social 
and political engineering. Indeed, by 1917 it had established the first 
welfare state of the Americas and its Constitution had granted women 
the right to vote.  By the 1910s and 1920s, Colombia, Uruguay, and 
Chile had achieved party systems that represented, from a liberal 
standpoint, a cutting edge design. Costa Rica, on its part, had also 
innovated, transforming a coffee growing valley into a democracy of 
sorts, already given signs of advanced modernity and liberal 
standings. Venezuela stood as one of the exceptions. Since the late 
nineteenth century military dictatorships under Cipriano Castro and 
Juan Vicente Gomez had stripped the country from its early liberal 
Bolivarian inspiration. Nevertheless, by the 1940s the country 
adopted a modern institutional design and political parties started to 
consolidate. Even under military-caudillo regimes in Venezuela the 
one state-one nation model remained as the major guideline of state 
building. In short, while many ideas about the nation and state 
building were imported from Europe and North America, their 
implementation and the resulting institutions stood on their own as 
novel and different. We can conclude, therefore, that in nineteenth 
century Latin America the nation-state –in close connection with the 
construction of national identity and the nation-- stood as pioneer 
modern products.     
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Futures and Nations 
“Discuss it, Planchet, out of discussion is born light.’ 
‘Well, then, since I have monsieur’s permission, I will tell him that, in 
the first place, there is the Parliament.’  
‘And next?’ Said D’ Artagnan. 
‘The Army’ 
‘Why, do you see anything else?’’  
‘Why, then the nation! Said Planchet. 
 
‘Is that all?’ Said D’Artagnan 
 
‘The nation which consented to the overthrow and death of the late 
King…and which will not be willing to disown its actions.’ Said 
Planchet. 
  
‘Planchet” said D’Artagnan, you argue like a cheese! The nation, the 
nation is tired of these gentlemen who give themselves such 
barbarous names, and who sing songs to it. Singing for singing’s 
sake, my dear Planchet. I have remarked that nations prefer singing 
marrying tunes to the plain chant.” * 
 
*Conversation between D’Artagnan and Planchet, from Alexander 
Dumas’ The Vicomte de Bragelonne, Oxford University Press, 1995, 
p. 148  
 
Nation and state stood side by side in the complex liberal 
imaginary of nineteenth century Latin America. As D’Artagnan say, 
however, state and nation can be perceived not only as distinct but 
also as divorcing and clashing forces. Dumas wrote in the nineteenth 
century, a time in which modern institutions of government were 
publicly and freely discussed. Conceptions of the nation varied; it 
could represent the popular will or betray it, it could oppose the state 
or it could support established governments.   In the Americas, but 
more energetically Europe and especially in France and Germany,  
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the relation between the nation and the state was many times 
perceived as incompatible. Government, for instance, was many 
times accused of “betraying the nation”. Other times, people regarded 
the state as anti-national and unpatriotic. The state can also be 
conceived as an empty box without its nation.  
Like it has often happened in Latin America, the responsibility 
for the mistakes made by the state or the ups and downs of the 
economy etc. were often blamed either on “the nation” or on external 
powers.  In Latin America the nation took, as it did in France, the 
character of an independent actor with a life of its own. Like in 
D’Artagnan’s suggestion, it was very often demagogically equated 
with the people. For many who defended a populist notion of the 
nation this was encouraging, because it made the nation more 
sensitive to the plea of its own children. The nation was expected to 
respond to the needs of the many, and governments actually often 
called upon it to save the country. It could, as Dumas argued, also be 
insensitive because, like the people, the nation could be manipulated. 
While the nation could be an instrument of opposition against those 
“gentlemen” who abused their power, it also seemed to respond 
sometimes too much to those who would sing the happy “tune” that it 
wanted to hear.   
Modernity, however, meant that state and nation were 
conceived as tied to one another.  The one state-many nation model 
appeared more unstable but as the twentieth century advanced in 
Latin America, especially in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, 
Paraguay, and Mexico, the nation achieved almost a higher status 
than the state and the balance between the one state-one nation  
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model appeared to be broken.  Loyalty to one seemed not to mean 
loyalty to the other, especially as the state was equated with 
government and politicians.  Early enough in the century the leaders 
of the Mexican Revolution publicly expressed this tension: revolting 
against the state did not mean to revolt against the nation. Most 
groups fighting the state, in fact, claimed to do it in the name of the 
nation.  In the 1930s and 1940s the rise of populism in many Latin 
American countries attempted again to glue together the state and 
the nation. Excluded popular sectors or powerful grass roots 
organizations that had worked outside the sphere of the state 
(unions, interest groups, peasant and workers’ rural cooperatives, 
and indigenous communities) were incorporated into government, 
reconstructing ruling coalitions and redefining the nation. The military 
were also part of these coalitions. Tensions seemed to subside 
during the Cold War era and, as mentioned, have emerged again 
under different guidelines in the twentieth first century. Yet the one 
state-one nation model still prevails  
In Latin America, these tensions between the nation and the 
state within the one state-one nation model, provided government 
with a valuable tool. It could elaborate a discourse of future hope for 
the nation without fully taken the responsibility to deliver.  “Enemies of 
the nation” could at times ruin these plans for the future of the nation 
and the nation, in abstract, seemed the only entity capable to decide 
its own future. The state could only help.  External powers could also 
act against the nation and government needed to defend it more 
often than not under the banner of nationalism, thus deviations from 
original commitments about building a better future for the nation  
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were justified.  In short, the future of the nation seemed to be more in 
the nation’s hands than in those of the state.  
In the imaginary of the nation that spanned the mid nineteenth 
century toward the beginning of the Cold War and beyond, elites and 
the citizenry alike conceived the nation as usually rich, generous, 
wealthy, and, especially, the master of incredible vast and never-
ending natural resources. A strong association with geography, 
territory, and land, emerged from the very beginning, challenging 
some literature that has strongly argued that nation, country, and 
territory are very different and separate things.
24 This was so because 
the nation was conceived as a wealth of natural resources and, like 
the land, a giver. No matter what, the nation never ceased to provide 
and the future never ceased to represent an open promise to all 
members of the national community. Yet, there was no sense of 
mission or predetermination. Promising futures but lurking 
uncertainty; a generous nation with endless resources that could 
continuously give but “men” and institutions (politicians, enemies of 
the nation, multinational corporations, foreign powers, foreign capital, 
banks, government) could always emerged and take away too much 
for themselves and betray other nationals. The future of the nation 
was promising and wealthy, but cycles of uncertainty could make that 
promise vanish. Apparently, not everybody participated in the 
promising future of the nation, neither in practice nor in theory. 
Excluded groups were not part of this nation where the future 
continuously promised although reality many times denied that 
                                            
24  See this discussion, for instance, in Luckacs, John. Democracy and Populism: Fear 
and Hatred. New Heaven, Yale University Press, 2005 
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promise. Most indigenous people, the very poor, the excluded and 
marginalized and so fourth, did not participate in that future hence did 
not identify with the nation. As much as the past, futures created that 
“emotional sentiment” needed to tie members to a nation. That was 
the predominant image of the nation for modern Latin America.   
Latin American nation-states provide examples of “civic 
nationalism”, that is, the idea that all people who live within a given 
territory dominated by a state can be part of the nation, regardless of 
their ethnicity, culture, or religion. Obviously nation building in North, 
Central, and South America offers plenty of examples of exclusion 
and/or limited citizenship. Yet, like France and the United States, the 
founding notion remained that of voluntary membership and 
mechanisms of exclusion were created on the basis of this model. 
Images of the future of the nation acted as a powerful incentive to 
attract membership. E. Hobsbawam has long argued that many tools 
are available in order to construct the nation.
25  Latin America adds a 
very important one: ‘imagining’ the future of the nation in order to 
create a sense of belonging to a common project. The objective was 
to capture members’ expectations about their individual futures and 
make them a part of a shared project. Unlike Europe, this tool took, in 
Latin America, a central role in nation building. Unlike the United 
States, this “future” lacked a sense of mission and it was not bound 
by religiosity. Therefore, unlike any other place in the nineteenth and 
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early twentieth century, but like many places in the twenty first, this 
became part of ‘imagining the nation’ --just to revert to Benedict 
Anderson’s phrasing.  Both elites and the state used images of the 
future as tools to build a modern construct upon which to materialize 
national identity. We find evidence that elites were not alone: 
immigrants and the lower classes did likewise. Therefore, of all the 
“ingredients”, as Barrington Moore called them, that states have at 
their disposal to construct the nation and national identity, in Latin 
America images of its possible “futures” ranked paramount.
26  
This goes against most established literature. The complexities 
of defining the nation become apparent in the long and often quoted 
list of factors examined by Ernest Renan in the nineteenth century. 
By the time the new republics of Latin America were still trying to 
construct their nation-states Renan delivered a conference in Paris 
that has influenced most literature ever since.
27 After surveying his 
world and identifying the different factors that one would need to 
arrive to a definition of the nation, Renan discarded most of them. His 
list included language, ethnicity, culture, and a common history. Not 
satisfied with any of these tools, Renan claimed that   “A nation is a 
soul, a spiritual principle”. Such “principle”, however, rested upon a 
rich “common heritage and memories” and an actual “agreement 
                                            
26 Fernando Lopez-Alves, “Nations and Futures: Latin America and Europe during the 
Fist Wave of Globalization”, paper presented at the American Sociological Association, 
Boston, 2008 
 
27 See Ernest Renan’s well known essay, “What is a Nation?” in Geoff Eley and Ronald 
Grigor Suny (ed.) Becoming National, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp 41-
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…and the desire to live together”.
28  Thus while Renan was dubious 
about the weight of the past in constructing the nation he certainly 
thought that it was much more important than other factors. Most 
literature after him has continued to think likewise or made the past 
and historical experiences the most powerful variable. For Renan, 
and for many others, the “love of the nation” is basically spontaneous 
and, in a sense, voluntary, because it emerges naturally among the 
members of a given community that shared a history. National 
consciousness, in other words, is rooted back into the past. In 
addition, he and others have long claimed that this spontaneous 
“national sentiment” cannot be produced by governmental 
craftsmanship. For Renan, thus, nations constitute the natural 
baseline of any political organization and they cannot be artificially 
created.
29   
As can be seen given the previous discussion, the experience 
of modern Latin America with nation building challenges these 
‘classic’ claims. To start, the past was not as important a tool as the 
promises of the future. Second, while the past provided an important 
tool to build national identity (hence the construction of national 
history) it did not suffice. The future proved much more useful and 
less compromising.  Third, this argument underestimated the role of 
the state. While one cannot argue with absolute certainty that in Latin 
America the state completely and entirely created the nation, one can 
                                            
28 Renan, op. cit. p 153.  
 
29 This is basically is the conclusion of the French theologian in his famous 1882 
Sorbonne  lecture , “What is a Nation?” op. cit. pp 41-55. 
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detect powerful mechanisms by which the state crafted the nation 
and created national sentiment.   
One needs to remember that these states were weak.
 30  A 
particularity of Latin America was the simultaneity of state and nation 
building, which poses intriguing questions about state capacity. The 
strong role of the state in nation building is not exclusive of Latin 
America. Other regions of the world come to mind: Africa in the 1960s 
and 1970s; Central Asia and parts of Eastern Europe in the 1990s. 
Yet Latin America remains a pioneer in terms of the simultaneity of 
state and nation building and in having built both under intense 
globalization. In addition, globalization coincided with a strong push 
for modernization.   
I do not claim that the “heavy weight” of the past is not crucial. 
A shared history can contribute to construct the emotional ties that 
bond members with their nation. National histories, flags, shared 
traumatizing experiences and so forth reinforce and create national 
sentiment.  I argue, however, that this did not suffice. The new 
republics required a new foundation. Their national histories had to 
be written, and they were. However, images of a common future in 
the conceptualization of the nation made it possible to make those 
foundations more credible and people to identify with the state and 
the emerging “nation”.  
As much as for Renan for Max Weber history explained 
national sentiment. He was puzzled by the complexities and 
ambiguities of the term nation: “it certainly cannot be stated in terms 
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of empirical qualities common to those who count as members of the 
nation,… (because)… the reasons for the belief that one represents a 
nation vary greatly”.
31 For Weber, requirements for membership 
depended on context. And for him that context revealed the 
importance of a shared past. My argument is that that context in 
which the nation is constructed also includes both images of what the 
future of the nation would look like, and how that future could come 
about. Different past experiences could explain dissimilar kinds of 
membership and variations in the conceptualization of the nation. Yet 
images of the future of the nation also explain membership. It strongly 
contributed to that sense of attachment that all literature agrees is 
central to construct national identity.    
Anthony Smith, who has written profusely on nationalism, also 
argues for the importance of history. The nation, he writes “is a 
named historical population occupying a historical territory and 
sharing common myths and memories, a public culture, and common 
laws and customs for all members”. 
32  Smith does not completely 
discard the construction of the future as part of the definition of the 
nation. He includes the idea of national destiny for instance, as part of 
his understanding of the nation. “The nation, in the eyes of 
nationalists, can be described as a community of history and destiny, 
or better, a community in which history requires and produces 
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32 See, among other writings, his “History and National Destiny: Responses and 
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destiny. This idea of destiny carries much more emotional freight than 
notions of the future”
33  
Our argument differs from Smith’s in that he stresses the idea 
of destiny, and we underline the idea of future. He is right that the 
idea of destiny can be powerful. It is also consistent with his 
argument because destinies are usually predetermined by a glorious 
past. This, Latin America did not have; the national histories that were 
written logically glorified the heroes of independence, the “people”, 
intellectuals, and nation builders. Yet, it was too recent a past and 
could not be used with the same weight and rooted consciousness as 
it could in Europe. Unlike “density”, the meaning of “future” contains 
no predetermination.  Destinies and pasts are usually glorious; 
futures are open and most of the times uncertain. In connection to the 
idea of destiny, a golden past, as Smith puts it, will finally “shine forth 
once again”.
34   Latin America shows that nations that can claim no 
golden past (either real or fabricated) make the future shine even 
more.  
Open futures and a strong sense of hierarchy can coexist in 
definitions of the nation. Latin America is an example. One does not 
find, for instance, “horizontal camaraderie”, as defined by Benedict 
Anderson’s and many others.  For Anderson, a nation is “an imagined 
political community –and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest 
                                            
33 Smith, Nationalism, op. cit. p. 30. 
 
34 Smith, ibid. p 31.  
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nations will never know most of its fellow members, meet them, or 
even herd of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their 
community”. 
35  In Latin America, however, these nations developed 
as status conscious and class oriented. The state enforced 
mechanisms of inclusion and promoted particular images of the 
nation while attacking others. Like in the United States, race 
remained an unresolved issue although different mechanisms of 
exclusion were used. As is well known, Native Americans as well as 
Africans and its descendents and poor Creoles did not participate in 
decision-making or did under severe restrictions. The “emotional 
attachment” uniting members to the nation was, therefore, very 
different depending on what class, race, status, or ethnicity people 
happened to belong. For the most part, the resulting nations 
represented a construct where horizontal lines of camaraderie were 
blurred but those of hierarchy and status stood firm. 
Ideas of open futures as part of national identity places Latin 
America closer to the United States than to Europe. Yet, Latin 
America inaugurates a different modern way to use “the future” in 
nation building and, as we shall see, did it in a way very different from 
that of the United States.  Like is also the case today with many 
regions of the world that are constructing national identity under 
global pressures, international factors played an enormous role in 
shaping the region’s national identity. Indeed, global influences were 
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a part of the different conceptions of the future that forged the 
nation...  
One of the findings of the twentieth first century is that global 
change and the nation-state are intimately connected. This, Latin 
America had discovered long ago.  A second finding is that national 
identity appears to be linked to globalization. Again a discovery that 
Latin American republics made roughly 140 years ago during the 50 
year period that spanned from the 1870s to the early 1930s.  National 
identity has either being considered and anti-globalization trench from 
which to defend what is “ours” or a dying entity that progressively 
looses “the national” under the overwhelming power of a growing 
“global culture” or “foreign influence”. These images, as we have 
seen, have been shaped by modernization and globalization 
literature. These claims are not news for Latin America either but, 
more importantly, they are not based on solid evidence. 
Arguments about the death of national identity are similar to 
what we heard about the withering of the state. Nations have been 
seeing as melancholic memories of a not so golden past.
36 In fact, the 
vanquishing of nationalism and the weakening of national identity 
seemed, for some, accomplished. In 1999, for example, Ross Poole 
predicted that “the conditions which have sustained nationalism are 
themselves undergoing transformations and that, it is now possible to 
                                            
36 See, for instance, Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy…this view is also implicit in 
rosy versions of globalization, such as Freedman, Thomas, The World is Flat 
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envisage –however tentatively—the end of nationalism.”
37  Weaker 
states and growing global markets could not sustain nationalism.
38 
Globalization, thus, has been viewed as a destroyer of national 
identity. We have however known other destroyers before. Both 
World Wars were supposed to weaken (and some argued erase) 
nationalism and identity. Because ethnic nationalism lay at the roots 
of both the Great and the Second World War the world that followed 
was supposed to be one free from the clashing of nationalities and 
the “paranoia” of nationalism. Did not Europe create the EU, in part, 
to avoid further clashes of nationalities?  National identity, however, is 
strong and thriving. Latin America has long shown that rather than 
eliminating each other globalization and national identity melted into a 
modern construct that imported what was “foreign” and treated it as if 
it were “ours”. Three of the big actors of today’s global scenario were 
present: globalization, changing national identities, and immigration.
39 
At present, Latin America continuous to show that also under the 
second wave of globalization national identity can absorb foreign 
influence and incorporate it into the nation. 
                                            
37 Poole, Ross, Nation and Identity, London, Routledge, 1999, p.5  Indeed, in his last 
chapter, Poole describes what he calls “the end of the affair”, based on the notion that 
the variables that, according to him, had created and feed nationalism, were further 
fading away and loosing power. 
 
38  Ibid, p. 46.  His argument is more complex: together with changes in state structures, 
from stronger to weaker, he lists “market relationships” that are now “more massively 
and visibly global than ever before” therefore weakening the nation state. “The traditional 
nationalist idea of self-sufficiency has become an obvious illusion”. The problem with this 
argument is that the nation as a community and nationalism as a movement or ideology 
go beyond and are richer than the idea of self-sufficiency.    
 
39 As is well known, Europeans and other immigrants arrived in waves during mid and 
late 1800s and early 1900s.  In Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile foreign influence was 
enormous; in Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru considerable, and everywhere in the 
region important.  
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 Modernization and Globalizations 
Modernization and globalization are distinct phenomena and 
have generated two separate literatures. Both of them have provided 
macro frameworks of analysis and theories of international change. In 
terms of the nation, nationalism, and national identity, they have 
contributed implicit --and explicit-- frameworks that we have used to 
explain different conceptions of the nation both in core and periphery, 
not to mention the collective action of nationalism. Their valuable 
contribution to our understanding of the nation-state has been noted. 
Unfortunately, for the most part these theories have not been a part 
of growing literature on the nation, nationalism, and national identity, 
especially when it comes to the study of Latin America. Theories of 
modernity, in fact, seemed to have been either forgotten or not useful 
in this literature. And when literature on the nation includes the 
international context does so under the powerful momentum of 
theories of globalization. Yet for all the importance of globalization 
theory much work on nation building or national identity in Latin 
America does not include comparative macro analysis. Indeed, 
comparative approaches to the nation and national identity have been 
more the exception than the rule, leaving a theoretical vacuum that 
needs to be filled in order to obtain a more accurate “big picture”.  My 
claim, however, is that our understanding of the nation is incomplete 
if international factors are not included. Indeed they are a crucial 
“ingredient” in the construction of national identity and what is “ours”.   
Despite obvious differences, theories of modernization and 
globalization have favored similar lines of causation. Modernization  
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and globalization are usually argued to flow from the core to the 
periphery, from the developed regions of the system to the less 
developed or “underdeveloped”, from the industrialized countries that 
enjoyed early industrialization to the regions that did not. Literature on 
national identity and nationalism has been influenced by this model, 
which has worked against the idea of Latin America as a modernizer. 
Modernization initiates usually at the core and, from there, 
spreads throughout the peripheries. Its main engine has usually 
rested with the developed, capitalist, western democracies. The 
process usually provokes “adjustments and reactions” on the less 
developed. Versions of globalization have painted a similar picture. 
Like modernization before it, globalization has been argued to 
accentuate poverty and increase the gap between the rich and the 
poor, destroy cultures, and vanquish national identities. It has also 
been attributed positive effects on economy and society since, in the 
long run, is seen as mitigating the social gap and creating a more 
equalitarian, fair, and technologically advanced world.
40 Again, 
causality, for the most part, emanates from the core of the global 
system in both theories. 
Theoretically globalization creates a multi polar integrated 
world. It is “global” precisely because of interconnectedness and 
multidirectional causality. And yet we find a different “status” of 
causality. Very much like the old paradigm of modernization, the less 
                                            
40  See, for instance, Friedman, Thomas The Word is Flat, and also his The Lexus and 
the Olive Tree.  
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developed regions of the world seem to have lesser influence on the 
processes. This is especially true of national identities, which appear 
to change by “reacting” “adjusting” or “resisting” the core’s global 
culture and soft power. Of course India, China, Brazil, and for a long 
time Russia, are not considered part of the periphery; Japan has 
traditionally enjoyed a different status as well. In the last decade we 
have seen a sustained effort on the part of China, India, Southeast 
Asian and Middle Eastern countries to bypass Washington and 
London trying to create a financial and industrial exporting system 
that would no longer depend upon the older core.  One can argue 
that these countries have, therefore, become an engine of 
globalization. Yet, does literature seriously see them as “creators” of 
the global system with a similar status as that of the traditional core? 
Or is that status still reserved only for the old capitalist heart of the 
system?
41 This is a very important question for theories of the nation 
and national identity both in the periphery and core. 
As we shall see below, similar to the status assigned to Latin 
America in modernization literature peripheries are seldom seeing as 
creating globalization or modernity.  Brazil, for instance, the owner of 
unparalleled natural resources and middle range technology which in 
combination make the country an important global player, is not really 
considered a generator of globalization.  Neither is Argentina or 
Mexico, the two other Latin American giants. In the process of 
                                            
41 These growing giants do more than generating “bouncing back” effects across the 
global system. China is the bank of the United States and an industrial power; India a 
provider of high communications technology that has created an increasingly high 
technology exporting sector 
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modernization no Latin American country was thought of generating 
any authentic modernity.  Today, likewise, literature sees the role of 
Latin American countries in the global system as globalization 
‘receivers’ rather than as globalization ‘creators’.
42  When it comes to 
interpretations of Latin America globalization theory seems to 
somehow preserve the old causal paradigms of the bipolar world. 
And with it, it also preserves old assumptions about national identity.    
Is this paradigm wrong? In many ways, it is. It has ignored Latin 
America’s role as a modernizer and thus it has missed the region’s 
contribution to the construction of a modern modular form of the 
nation and of the nation-state which is a fundamental piece in the 
construction of the modern West.  Without revisiting the role of the 
Iberian and Latin American world in creating modernity, available 
theories of Modernity, Nationalism, National Identity, Dependency, 
World Systems, and Globalization remain incomplete. We have 
known for a long time that, for a number of very good reasons, 
theories of the global system have taken England, France, Holland, 
Germany, and, starting in the 18th century, the United States as the 
big players, makers, and exporters of modernity and globalization. 
Yet, this picture misses important contributions to the expansion of 
modernity and globalization that do not rest with the old core. World 
Systems and Globalization theories has added much complexity to 
                                            
42 The “tequila effect” or the Brazilian financial crises of the 1980s and 1990s have been 
recognized to have dreadful effects on the global system. Those events convinced 
scholars that causality could go from the periphery to the center. Yet this was interpreted 
more as problems of adjusting to global circumstances than as really creating global 
influence. For a discussion on the distinction between “Globalization Receivers” and 
“Globalization Creators”, see the Introduction in Diane Johnson and Fernando Lopez-
Alves, ed. Globalization and Uncertainty in Latin America, McMillan, 2007.   
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this picture but still the chain of causality remains, at bottom, similar. 
The addition of new runner ups to global dominance (China, India) or 
the recycling of older powers (Russia, Japan) contributed more 
complex --and realistic-- causal networks. My claim is that this is still 
not enough to adequately explain the nation, national identities, and 
the nation-state. As it has at times softly argued it is not enough 
either to account for institutions that for a long time we have portrait 
as side effects of changes occurring at the core. High levels of 
capitalist development, cutting edge technology, higher levels of 
industrial production, and financial sophisticated networks are 
sufficient but not necessary conditions to become a modernizer. A 
similar argument can be made about what makes a region of the 
world either a “globalizer” or a recipient of globalization.  
In Modernization Theory Latin America and other areas would 
represent a sort of “Distorted Modernity” which grew out of a 
background of colonialism, dependence, low industrial development 
and, also for many authors, a “traditional” set of values and mores 
that tended to slow down modernization.  This perception has found 
echo in much globalization theory today. Partly as a consequence, 
we still find ambiguity in literature on Latin America as to where the 
Iberian-Latin American world really belongs. Is it traditional or 
modern? Is it Western or non-Western? Does it represent a sort of 
category in between?   All these questions reflect on the way 
literature has studied national identity and nation making in the 
region.   
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 Figure 1 represents the image that emerges when one surveys 
well-known theories that have studied Latin America and placed it in 
an international context. As can be seen, Latin America is mostly 
pictured as “reacting” and “adopting” modern influences from other 
countries, regions, or even financial institutions. Vectors coming from 
these actors shape Latin America while vectors of influence coming 
from the region toward international actors seem to have little impact 
except when, as we shall see,  one talks about “culture”.    
Figure 1 about here. 












MODERNIZING INFLUENCES AND LA   
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To sum up, nation building under the one state one nation 
formula was a key part of modernization and the consolidation of 
modern forms of national identity world wide.  Perhaps more than any 
other regions in “the periphery” Latin America has contributed to the 
global consolidation of modernity in three connected ways:  
1) The pioneer construction of models of the nation and 
national identity that question today’s accepted wisdom: the 
use of “open futures” as a tool of nation building.  
2) The simultaneous construction of the state and the nation, 
two related but different phenomenon. Such simultaneity in 
the case of Latin America compels comparison and 
contributes to a needed theory of the nation-state in the 
sense pointed out above.  What comes first, the state or the 
nation? In Europe, the nation sometimes came first 
(Germany). In the United States, it has also been argued 
that the nation preceded the state. In other parts of Europe 
(Spain) and in regions of Asia and the Middle East the state 
consolidated first, the nation followed long after. In other 
European cases, the debate is still open (France). 
3)  The construction of the one state-one nation model under 
intense globalization --the so-called ‘first wave’, circa 1870-
1920 and modernization, since this is the time in which the 
paradigm of modernization stood as a model worldwide. The 
nation-state and national identity, thus, emerged in a context 
characterized by modernization, the erosion of hegemonies 
and the consolidation of new world powers, not to mention  
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the emergence and redefinition of social classes, conflict, 
and culture, worldwide.  A situation that facilitates the 
identification of causal linkages between domestic and 
international factors in connection with the nation and 
national identity. Sizeable parts of Europe, Africa, and the 
Middle East formed nation-states at a later time and under 
different international circumstances not necessarily marked 
by globalization. Thus, global influence on national identity 
finds a crucial comparative and pioneer example in Latin 
America. A useful comparative instance when one thinks of 
similar processes that took place in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Africa, Central and Southeast Asia and parts of the 
Middle East during the late twentieth century, under the so-
called second wave of globalization.   
Again, a crucial question of this first decade of the twentieth first 
century is whether we are witnessing the melting of ‘the modern’ glue 
that since the nineteenth holds state and nation together. Can a new 
model emerge? Would the recent policies of some Latin American 
countries continue to challenge this model, as in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Venezuela, or Peru, not to mention ubiquitous European 
tensions between the central state and “autonomous” regions (Spain, 
Italy, England, Russia)?. As happened during the first wave, 
globalization both exerts pressures over national identity everywhere 
and leads to a resurgence of its importance, too. Theories about the 
death of the state under the sweeping winds of globalization (and 
particularly neo-liberalism) never held any real substance. Instead,  
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however, one can argue that today’s globalization plays against the 
modern link between state and nation forged during the first wave. 
We have made this argument elsewhere.
43  Recent (2009) surveys in 
Latin America show that the notion of “the nation” as an indivisible 
unit is weakening, and that about 36 to 39% of those interviewed do 
not know how to define their nations.
44 Will this trend take us back to 
pre-modern times? Or to a different future where none of these 
categories are adequate? Before we go back to our argument about 
globalization, futures, and nations, a brief detour is needed.    
 
Chapter I:   
IMAGES AND FUTURES OF THE LATIN AMERICAN NATION  
Where Does Latin America Belong? 
Confusion about the role of the Iberian/Latin American world in 
modernization processes and its capacity to create modernity finds 
roots in a conception of a modern West which, for much literature, is 
the exclusive product of American, French, and British legacies. 
Anglo-North American liberal thinking offers a wealth of philosophical 
                                            
43 See the recent study by Fernando Lopez-Alves and Raul Aragon, “La Nacion 
en la Urbe Post-Neo Liberal” paper presented at the Conference “Globalizacion and 
Identidades Nacionales,” Universidad Catolica del Uruguay” Montevideo, Uruguay, 
September 30
th, 2009.  
44 Fernando Lopez-Alves and Raul Aragon, The Divorce between Citizens and the State 
in Latin America” work in progress. Surveys in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile included 
1200 cases each, and were financed by PICTO grant in conjunction with the UAI in 
Buenos Aires.   
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and theoretical thinking regarding theories of government, the rights 
of men, democracy, development, and social equality. What other 
regions of the world and other societies have contributed to 
transform, add, re-create, shape, and put in practice the basic 
principles of modernity, however, has been scarcely studied. The 
Iberian/Latin American tradition, for instance, has also a contribution 
to make to both the theory and practice of modernization. As Juan 
Marichal has forcefully argued, since the sixteenth century Spain 
produced a clear, strong, and forceful notion of ¨liberty” and liberalism 
that has gone unobserved.
45     
French scholarly work, like the British-North American literature, 
has for the most part portrait Latin America as a recipient of 
modernity. French philosophers viewed Spain as a country with no 
enlightened traditions and therefore one that could make no 
contribution to modern thinking. In 1721 Montesquieu argued along 
these lines, describing Spain and the Iberian tradition as “incapable” 
of generating modern values and ideas. Whether Montesquieu was 
right or wrong about his view of Spain in the 1720s is a point of 
debate. What it is known, however, is that a few decades after, and 
contrary to these arguments, Spain was playing an important role in 
the enlightenment.
46    
                                            
45 Juan Marichal, El Secreto de Espana: Ensayos de historia intelectual y politica, 
Santillana, Taurus, 1995 
 
46 Juan Marichal, op. cit 1995, pp 15-28 
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Centuries after, similar misperceptions about Latin America still 
prevail.  No one denies that the area presents a number of “modern” 
features but it continues to be represented as a beneficiary of modern 
ideas created somewhere else.
47  Similar to Anglo-American literature 
that we will examine below and studies produced in Latin America, a 
quasi romantic view of the Latin American condition finds its place in 
French writings on Latin America.
 48 Like much other literature, it has 
praised “cultures”, music, literature, art, collective action, grass roots 
organization, and lifestyles.  
Historically and socially, Latin America has been acknowledged 
to represent one of the most enthralling social and political 
experiences of the modern world. We have a wealth of data and 
studies focusing on the region. The great first encounter of 
Europeans with Native American civilizations, the inevitable slavery 
and subjugation of its indigenous peoples, the clash of these 
civilizations, the allure and horrors of the conquest, etc. have 
fascinated scholars.  Much has been written about the social 
structure and advanced technology of its ancient civilizations, its 
economic dependence, its privilege natural resources, its incessant 
turbulent political, ethnic, and social conflicts, its political systems and 
                                            
47 The prevalent image that emerges is that of an imperfect expression of the ideas of 
the French Revolution and Liberalism which provides the foundation for regimes prone 
to conflict, military intervention, or revolution. 
 
48 The well-known and many times cited work of Regis Debary on Latin America, for 
instance, can, for the most part, be placed within this tradition, although Debray stands 
out in this tradition as a very pragmatically oriented writer. See his Revolution in the 
Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America, : Monthly Review 
Press, 1967  
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institutions. In addition, most work on the region has registered the 
impact of several globalizations, starting with that of the sixteenth 
century and that created colonialism. Latin America connects with at 
least five empires (Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British and, of 
course, the US, if we were to consider this last country as such).
49 No 
question that all these aspects of Latin America are more than 
enough to place it among one of the most absorbing social and 
political laboratories of our world. Still, other regions can make similar 
claims on many of these counts. As we argued, however, the region 
has distinctive claims to make.   
Globalization as a conceptual construct is still an ongoing 
debate that obviously goes beyond liberalism or neo-liberalism --
although in Latin America these two different meanings have, in 
practice, been identified as one. What one can for sure say is that no 
region or country in the world could claim to represent the utmost 
archetypical “globalized” society. No such an archetype exists, 
whether in the debate or in practice. Is Spain less or more globalized 
than the United States, Britain, China, or Germany? It all depends on 
parameters that are still a work in progress.  Regarding the debate on 
“modernity”, the core has long claimed it. Yet under closer inspection 
no region or country in the core has fully incarnated the paradigm 
either.   Neither the United States nor Britain or France, the 
archetypes of modernity in the literature, can be considered totally 
“modern”. Surely all would depend on degrees of modernity rather 
                                            
49 For a discussion of the US as an Empire and its connections with Latin America, see 
F. Lopez-Alves and Daniel Dessein (ed.) , Siete Escenarios para el Siglo XXI, 
Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 2004, pp 13-51  
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than on absolutes. Nevertheless, how would countries at the core 
rank if compared with one another? Which would be the no.1 modern 
country? This is an exercise that Modernization Theory never 
attempted. Rather, it focused more on ranking the peripheries, task 
that continued under more sophisticated paradigms by World System 
Theory.  
Latin America has been viewed as a sort of a sort of “distorted 
modernity”.
50  Both work from the Left or the Right of the political 
spectrum have, on this point, coincided. Literature has traditionally 
divided Latin America into regions, and assigned different degrees of 
“modernity” to each; all of it, however, was interpreted taken as a 
number of cases of distorted modernity. Argentina, Uruguay, and in 
part Chile have, according to accepted wisdom, represent more 
“western and European” versions, lands of recent settlement, etc.,  
while others such as Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay or Ecuador much less 
so. Colombia and Venezuela, together with some Central American 
countries like Panama or Dominican Republic have been considered 
groups of their own, divided by visible differences in terms of degrees 
of development. Mexico has often been perceived as a “special”, at 
times even called “unique”, case of modernity, and so forth.  
Among Latin American intellectuals “distorted modernity” 
became appealing.
51  “Distortions” have been praised as something 
                                            
50  For a full discussion of this literature see below in part II of this book.  
 
51 This point has been made many times. See, for instance, Jose Mauricio Domingues, 
La Modernidad Contemporanea en Latin America, Siglo XXI, 2009, p. 11 
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positive. Precisely because of underdevelopment and inequality, it 
has been claimed, the area has engaged in active protest and 
collective action, boasting one of the highest records of social 
mobilization in the world. Today, the region has been perceived as 
the forefront of revolution, anti-globalization, and anti-neo-liberal 
doctrine.
 52   Nevertheless, instability and revolutionary collective 
action can represent modernity itself, which by its very nature has 
triggered revolution and conflict in both core and periphery.  
It seems redundant to say that Latin America belongs to the 
modern West. No serious argument to the contrary, in fact, has been 
put forward. And yet some ambiguity in the literature does exist. 
According to the North American Conservative Right, the region has 
for a long time been considered not truly “modern” or even “Western”. 
In the mid 1980s Jean Kirkpatrick, the US representative to the 
United Nations, often argued that this vast area belonged to the West 
but only geographically. It really lay outside the West socially, 
politically, and economically. It has also been said that Latin America 
continues to represent “traditional” values that are somewhat similar 
to Western values but not really western.
53 In addition, the division 
                                            
52  Perry Anderson, for instance, has fairly recently made this argument in New Left 
Review, although expressed in very different terms. New Left Review, Fall issue, 2008, 
pp 7-10. See Ross Puggia, Globalizations, Neoliberalism, and Capitalism in Latin 
America, See also the empirically grounded argument made by William Robinson in his 
Latin America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2008     
  
53  See, for instance, the work of Howard Wiarda, a respected culturalist who has done 
extensive work on Latin America and who has forcefully argued that Latin America is not 
really totally “western” in terms of its culture and values. In his edited 1992 volume, other 
authors contributed as well to this view:  Wiarda, Howard J. ed.   Politics and Social  
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between a more “traditional” Latin America and a more “modern” one 
continues to be confusing. Distinctions address more ideal types than 
the reality of the region, in which one is really hard pressed to find 
communities or institutions that could be considered “traditional” or 
“modern” in the archetypical sense coined by modernization theory 
during the 1960s. And while to look at the region as revolutionary 
“distorted” modernity is perhaps more attractive or even romantic it is 
not accurate.  
Modernity, Nation, and “The Masses” 
  Modernization, David Apter suggested in the late 1960s, is 
“…a special kind of hope. Embodied within it are all the past 
revolutions of history and all supreme human desires. The 
modernization revolution is epic in its scale and moral in its 
significance. Its consequences may be frightening. Any goal that is so 
desperately desired creates political power, and this force may not 
always be used wisely or well.” 
54 Apter was of course referring to the 
revolutionary impact that modernization, as an approach and a 
practice, had exercised upon social scientists, political leaders, and 
governments around the world in the 1960s. Yet this description of 
modernization fully applies to Latin America during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century. 
                                                                                                                                  
Change in Latin America:  Still a Distinct Tradition?  Third edition.  Boulder, CO:  
Westview Press 
54 David Apter, The Politics of Modernization. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 
1965, p 1. 
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An overwhelming majority of nation makers were modernizers 
who perfectly knew that their realities were different from those of 
Europe or the United States. Since the foundation of most of these 
republics Presidents, public figures, and intellectuals, persistently 
complained about the backwardness of their societies and the need 
to “modernize” their countries in their own way.
55 In the River Plate, 
for instance, this has been amply documented.
56  Similar claims can 
be made about Colombia.
57 Most nationalist discourse in the region, 
whether coming from civilian or military reformers, the Right or the 
Left, perceived the modernization of he region as a major goal to be 
achieved. Their aim, at least as expressed in most public documents, 
Presidential addresses, and the media of the time, was to create 
modern nations, tuning up the region to a transforming global 
environment.
58  
                                            
55 For a discussion on the position of Latin American state makers and intellectuals with 
regards to the modernization of their countries, see Fernando Lopez-Alves, “Between 
the Economy and the Polity in the River Plate”, monograph, Institute of Latin American 
Studies, University of London, 1994. 
 
56 In the case of Argentina during the period of state formation, for instance, Tulio 
Halperín Donghi has forcefully argued this point.  See, especially, his Revolución y 
guerra; formación de una elite dirigente en la Argentina criolla. 1972, Buenos Aires:  
Siglo XXI. See also Politics, Economics and Society in Argentina in the Revolutionary 
Period. 1975, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. See,  especially, his  Proyecto y 
construcción de una nación:  Argentina 1846–1880.  Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho, 
1980 
 
57 For a full discussion and references, see the chapter on Colombian state making  
(chapter three) in Fernando Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin 
America, 1810-1900, Duke University Press, 2000 
 
58  For an examination of these documents see Fernando Lopez-Alves, “Nations, States, 
and Futures, in Latin America: 1864-1930” paper presented at the ASA Conference, 
August 2008, Boston. 
  
  57 
While one can claim that many African, Asian and Middle 
Eastern leaders and institution makers have also been fascinated by 
creating modern nation-states and that they also wanted to link their 
countries to a rapidly changing global system, these regions did 
differed from Latin America in that they did not go through a similar 
processes of globalization and modernity. Modernizers in Latin 
America acted as if they had no other choice but creating nations that 
followed what they thought of as modern precepts and paradigms.  
From the standpoint of nation makers on the ground, Francis 
Fukuyama’s argument of “the end of history” could apply. Indeed, 
ruling elites that emerged from independence considered that 
republican rule, some sort of democracy, and a nation forged upon 
the “right values” (that is, modern values) represented their only 
available alternative. As elsewhere, modernization implied a better 
future. In Latin America, as argued, images of the future were 
included into the conceptualization of the nation.  
We possess a wealth of archival work, especially 
correspondence between immigrants in Latin America and their 
relatives and friends in Europe, attesting to their hopes for a better 
future.
59  We know that, unlike in the United States or Europe today, 
where most immigrants have little influence in affairs of state, in Latin 
America the opposite was the case. Mutual aid societies, pressure 
groups, employers’ associations, owners associations involving 
industry and, at times, land, were organized, founded, and managed 
                                            
59  See, for instance, Jose C. Moya, Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in 
Buenos Aires 1850-1930, University of California Press, 1998, pp 13-44   
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by foreigners who tried to impose their views on government.  This 
was true not only of countries with large European immigrant 
populations, as Argentina and Uruguay, but also of Peru, Salvador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Bolivia, Colombia, and especially Venezuela. As 
we shall see in Part II, the mythical trust in the wealth of the new 
nations and their potential lay at the bottom of these expectations.  
Creoles were hopeful about the future of their nations as well. 
Presidential addresses, for instance, did not fail to describe the nation 
through its bright future and thus a better future for the members of 
the nation. Who were members of the new nations? Who did states 
want to recruit into the nation?  
Modernization requires the incorporation of new comers into the 
political scene, usually excluded sectors of the lower classes. In Latin 
America, the nation was conceptualized at a time in which some 
massive inclusion could not be avoided. Unlike Europe, from the 
onset the region had to cope with pressures from “the masses”. An 
important global event that shaped nation building from the start was 
the advent of a world of “consumers”, a part of the first wave of 
globalization. This “incorporation’” of the masses into the 
conceptualization of the nation was done at a different timing and in a 
different from the United States as well. Nations in Latin America 
emerged in a world where consumers’ preferences as well as the 
“masses” had started to shape both markets and industry.  As the 
Latin American nation-state was consolidating the “masses” became 
a political and economic actor. Jose Ortega y Gasset’s argument in 
The Revolt of the Masses seems pertinent here.  Describing the late  
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nineteenth century’s incorporation of “the masses” into politics, he 
wrote: “this is the time of the people because they now are the 
ultimate source of legitimacy”.
 60 After the French revolution, the 
crowd was perceived as an anarchic violent populace topping law, 
tradition, and order. Progressives and many liberals saw it differently: 
the masses represented the glorious armies of proletariat and 
socialists defending self determination and progress. Thus, urban 
crowds either became the most dangerous manifestations of modern 
life or the premonition of a future full of promise and inspiration.  
These crowds were apparently present in urban centers in 
Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia. 
By the end of the nineteenth century also Rio de Janeiro saw the 
threatening masses of liberated slaves and immigrants rapidly grow. 
Given their early high degrees of urbanization Buenos Aires and 
Montevideo, more than any other Latin American cities witnessed 
with apprehension what they perceived as a threat that paralleled that 
of the unruly crowds of Europe. The conceptualization of the nation 
would include these “masses” in both the role of consumers and 
immigrants. The “other”, therefore, became a part of the context from 
which the state drew its nation-making tools.  
In other words, unlike Europe and to an extent like the United 
States, from the onset of the process of nation building and the 
forging of national identity Latin America was forced to deal with 
important issues of political rights, inclusion, and race relations. 
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States had no choice but to “accommodate the masses” in a modern 
sense, both in social life and as part of the desired nation. Of course 
in response to upper class pressures government crafted institutional 
mechanisms to keep part of the masses at bay. Selected sectors of 
the lower classes were integrated in a way that would not upset the 
newly acquired privileged position of those on top. Nevertheless, 
under republican rule the “masses” could not be completely ignored. 
Neither could in Europe, but the Old World possessed different and 
long established mechanisms of integration or exclusion that by the 
end of the nineteenth century were still adequate and efficient. 
Monarchical rule, bishoprics, principalities, and other forms of 
aristocratic rule had long handle pressures from below.  In Latin 
America, old colonial institutions had been destroyed and the new 
ones had to create a new national identity that accommodated the 
“aspirations of the masses”.  
  Like in the United States and Canada or Australia, the masses 
were racially and culturally mixed. And so was the nation. As is 
known racial mixing was encouraged as long as nation makers 
trusted that large waves of European immigrants (Anglos and 
Germans were most desired) would steadily arrive to their shores and 
wash away compromising indigenous or African features in the 
population (Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay; later on Venezuela and 
Paraguay). Indeed the Argentinean, Uruguayan, Peruvian, and 
Brazilian states aggressively encouraged European immigration of 
desired “races”. The state sought to eliminate --or ignore-- racial, 
cultural, linguistic and ethnic differences to create the desired modern  
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nation. In Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay, for instance, it 
attempted to homogenize the nation through the public school 
system.
61 Argentina and Peru also did so by using universal male 
conscription into the army.  Immigrants and natives alike were 
“socialized” through military discipline into the cultural, linguistic, and 
political standards set up by the political elite as a definition of what 
the nation “ought to be”.
62 Some Uruguayan and Colombian political 
parties attracted large numbers of immigrants as well, acting as 
instruments of socialization, like the Colorados en Uruguay or the 
Liberals in Colombia. Nation-states, therefore, wished modern 
nations, and this could only be done by reconstructing their 
citizenship racially and socially. Government sought to build 
legitimacy through national identity but, at the same time, that 
legitimacy needed to emerge from the “right” national make up. 
Modernity was discriminatory and white, and states needed to have 
just one nation. Globalization required modern nations. They followed 
this model to the last consequences.  Brazil has always been 
considered an example of racial-social engineering regarding the 
construction of its nation and comparable to South Africa and the 
South in the United States.
63   
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Why not to adopt the formula already used by Asia, Europe, 
parts of the Middle East and Africa? Why not to consider the one 
state-many nations formula? First this alternative spoke of old 
imperial traditions, regional autonomies, and split identities that were 
perceived as threats to the newly formed states. Second, the many 
nations model was regarded as suitable only for large powerful states 
that could rule over large numbers of people. Third, and most 
importantly, it also represented non-Republican rule; there were 
plenty of examples in Europe that showed that Republics were not 
suited to rule over many nations. Empire and colonialism were also to 
be avoided by republics that wanted to be modern; besides, no Latin 
American state had the means to go in that direction.  Finally, 
indigenous as well as African influences were regarded as backwards 
and pre-modern, thus undeserving the status of “nations”. It should 
be noted that the experience of Latin America with the modern “one 
state-one nation” model provides one of the few examples in which in 
a whole region and for more than a century and a half states followed 
a similar modern paradigm of nation building. Compare this against 
the records of Africa, Western and Eastern Europe, South East Asia, 
Central Asia, and the Middle East.   
Lord Acton’s indictment, stemming from his assessment of the 
British imperial experience, that nations became stronger when 
possessing different centers of power represented by different 
nationalities and cultures, was rejected in Latin America. Acton 
believed that “A state which is incompetent to satisfy different races 
condemns itself;  a state which labors to neutralize, to absorb or  
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expel them, destroys it own vitality; a state who does not include 
them is destitute of the chief basis of self-government.”
64 Acton’s 
wisdom, however, sounded not modern enough for Latin America, 
which stuck to its own archetype of modernity. Only slowly the Latin 
American nation states acknowledged diversity, and when in the 
twentieth century they did so, they perceived it as something that 
needed to be integrated into a larger “national culture”. 
Not surprisingly strong tensions tended to undermine these 
nations; it is remarkable in fact that they have lasted as long as they 
have, and that states have succeeded at repressing alternative 
conceptions of the nation.  Its definition remained at times blurred and 
tense. Not everybody participated into the collective future of the 
nation and its promises; those who did not, were marginal to the 
nation and the political system in general. Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, 
Guatemala, Ecuador, Chile and, despite stronger efforts to the 
contrary on the part of the state, Mexico, are good examples. Some 
confusion also arose in countries that perceived themselves as more 
modern simply because their indigenous and black populations were 
smaller and their European populations larger like Argentina and 
Uruguay. Nevertheless, at the end one of the most powerful allures of 
the nation and the one that attracted most membership remained its 
promising future.  This, despite the many among the poor and the 
racially discriminated who were for a long time not incorporated as 
members of the nation.  
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Not everybody became a part of its national history either. 
Nation makers were in desperate need for a glorious national past 
and history. These republics were too young. Indigenous traditions 
were perceived as non-modern and therefore not suitable.  Observe 
that nation makers, however, in their need for symbols and traditions, 
allowed some fragments of the glorious Native American past to 
become a part of the definition of the nation and the proud emotional 
attachment of people with their national identity. Paraguay should be 
treated separate, as an intriguing case of a different type of political 
system closer in a lot of ways to Eastern Europe than to Latin 
America.
 65 Demographically and culturally Paraguay found itself 
divided into at least two identities and two nations, although the 
Guarani people, who can certainly qualify as a nation, can be argued 
not to constitute just one nation but many. Paraguay, however, also 
adopted the modern model of the nation and for a long time tried 
mercilessly to enforce it. The incorporation of the “masses”, therefore, 
was done through modern and strict political formulae that respected 
the indissoluble connection between one state and one particular 
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nation that needed to be created. Given this model, it was easy for 
new notions of political obligation and legitimacy to emerge in 
connection to International influences that became, as we shall see, a 
constitutive part of the nation.   
Portraits of Latin American Nations:  
 Modernization, World Systems, Dependency, and Comparative 
Literature 
Similar to the argument that in the 1960s modernization theory 
took as a banner, nineteenth century modernizers shared the 
assumption that modernity equaled progress. Indeed, it represented a 
“natural” path towards it and the right nation was required to achieve 
it. Socialist thinking and Marxism also praised this benefic side of 
modernity, but Latin America remained faithful to liberal ideology and 
capitalism. Already by the 1920s many were critical of modernity, 
questioning its beneficial effects and the goodness of its intentions. It 
was found that modern economic development did not always lead to 
a more fair distribution of wealth or progress. No linear path existed. 
In many was analogous to what globalization theory suggests today, 
modernization created conflicts too complex to be quickly, 
completely, or satisfactorily resolved.
66 Worldwide, modernization 
meant the displacement or the altogether elimination of many groups 
or nations. It could represent as Habermas and others have 
suggested a dissolving force that undermines collective solidarity and 
encourages alienation and social anomy.   
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These debates, however, were for the most part marginal to 
most Latin American nation makers. While similar arguments did find 
an echo among a handful of intellectuals, institution builders and a 
large part of the intelligentsia continued to equate modernity with 
progress, a better world, and a platoon from where their societies 
could be upgraded. Despite much criticism and debate about the 
meaning of modernization, two notions remained strongly rooted in 
Latin America. These notions were later recreated by modernization 
theory and today have been absorbed, in part, by theories of 
globalization. One is that modernity, progress, and social well-being 
are intimately connected. A number of globalization scholars do 
argue that way today.
67 The other is that, for better or for worse, what 
triggers modernization is the contact between core countries with the 
rest. Similar claims have been made about globalization.  
In 1960s Modernization Theory made this exact argument. It 
portrait Latin America as a byproduct of modernity created elsewhere. 
It basically reproduced the early meaning of modernity that 
nineteenth century state makers had long spelled out and adopted. A 
“classic” in the field, Cecil Black’s work spelled out perhaps better 
than any other the theory’s goals and assumptions. He brought the 
theory to bear on case studies representing “traditional” societies, a 
sound comparative effort on modernization that will be followed by 
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others.
68 Like its nineteenth century predecessors, Daniel Lerner, for 
instance, saw “traditional” society as something condemned to 
disappear in the wake of modern rapid change.
69 No wonder 
modernization scholars found in Latin America a huge geographical 
area that, in their opinion, represented different “transitions” from 
“traditional” to “modern” societies.  
The theory offered an account of Latin America that installed a 
strong image for years to come. Dependency Theory was, to a large 
extent, a response and a critic to Modernization Theory. It argued, 
among other things, that timing was crucial. Late developers faced 
very different and disadvantageous circumstances when compared 
with those countries that had made it into the core of the system. In 
addition, the dominant structure of power in the international system 
condemned the underdeveloped periphery to remain such; where 
modernization saw opportunity dependency saw exploitation and 
unequal exchange.
70 Capitalist expansion had destined Latin America 
to be a provider of raw materials and thus “unequal exchange”. One 
can find points of coincidence between the two theories, however, in 
terms of the way they viewed causality. Causal flows usually went 
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from core to periphery. In terms of national identity and nationalism, 
Dependency Theory did not have a lot to say, except that the former 
could be interpreted as part of the periphery’s response against 
“cultural imperialism” and the latter as the result of the core’s 
exploitation of the periphery.  Because Dependency Theory’s agenda 
did not include a study of Latin America in terms of its capacity to 
generate modernity, its modern features were either not noticed or 
largely interpreted as a result of dependency and the resistance 
against it.  
For Modernization Theory national identity in these traditional 
societies could not be considered fully “modern”. The region, as many 
others with the exception of the countries that were at the top of the 
development pyramid, was somehow in “transition” toward a more 
modern construction of the nation. “Developing” societies had a more 
modern sense of national identity; less developed societies or those 
which seem not to move in the development ladder at all, stack with 
“traditional” forms of conceptualizing their nations and creating 
national identity. Growing modern, advanced, and “rational” emotional 
attachment in terms of the ties that unite people to nations was 
expected. Dependency did not have the same expectations. The 
nation and national identity remained in a sort of diffuse zone where 
they did appear to reach neither a total dependent status nor a fully 
autonomous one. Because Modernization Theory claimed that 
development –and modernization-- had only been achieved by a few 
countries in the Western World, modern nations could only exist 
there. The rest represented different degrees or phases of an  
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inexorable “developing” process: modern nations and national identity 
were still in the making.
71  Dependency Theory elaborated responses 
to a number of these claims. Yet, when it came to the nation and 
national identity left the floor open for a discussion which never really 
took place.  Revolution and radical structural change, for the theory, 
represented one of the few possible solutions for countries that 
wanted to break away from dependency.  Theories of revolution had 
found that drastic revolutionary change was more likely to happen 
when modern organized actors were at play. But the theory did not 
really elaborate on the connection between dependency, radical 
change, and types of national identity or definitions of the nation. Nor, 
for that matter, did anybody else, except when discussing “culture”, a 
variable often times confused with national identity.  
Unlike Dependency Theory and in agreement with theoretical 
premises rooted in both ancient and modern interpretations of 
universal history, Modernization Theory expected that a number of 
“crises” and “sequences” of “political development” would push some 
countries lying at the bottom of the modernization ladder near the 
democracies at the top.
72  Cultural change was supposed to take 
place as well, although at a slower pace. Culture, which many times 
included definitions of national identity and that was conceived as an 
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overreaching category that included most everything having to do 
with values, religion, habits, and emotions, was assumed to change 
slowly. Thus, national identities were also changing at a slow pace, or 
not changing at all.  Because it was assumed that in order to achieve 
some degree of desired modernity these countries could take as a 
model the modernizing paths set up by those who had already done 
so (Western Europe and the United States), one can assume that if  
modern nations were to emerge in the periphery they would resemble 
those at the core.  Dependency Theory did not really elaborate on 
this. Nevertheless, once could ask some questions. For instance, if 
countries were trapped into an international network of power 
relations that they did not control, were their national identities 
trapped in conceptions and “emotional attachments” to their nations 
that they did not control as well? 
If economic development was the product of the right values 
and mores, as Modernization argued, then the right nation would 
emerge only if values changed.  In mid nineteenth century often times 
quoted argentine President Faustino Sarmiento agreed. The central 
issue to be resolved by Latin America was the struggle between 
“civilization and barbarism”. Likewise, for modernizers in the 1960s 
the struggle took place between “traditional and modern” society. The 
argument is well-known. Could the psychological make up of these 
people change? Could modernity, prosperity, and modern 
constructions of the nation and national identity be successfully 
brought into their societies? The same question could have been 
posed about Europe but it was asked, instead, of Latin America, the  
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Middle East, and Africa. Modernization arguments were similar to the 
ones made later by the social capital literature.
 73 The “take off” did 
not just need savings: it also required an adequate set of morals, 
attitudes, and standards.
74  Cultural change was possible but its ways 
remained mysterious.
75  Theories could not really predict its course.
76 
Spanish and Indigenous heritages seemed a hindrance and modern 
nations just a postponed project. In many ways, nineteenth century 
Latin American modernizers shared the same idea. 
In the late 1960s, Samuel Huntington, somewhat a critic of 
Modernization Theory --although in many ways a “modernist” himself-
-  published his Political Order in Changing Societies; in it, he placed 
Latin America in a sort of twilight zone of its own: again, 
geographically in the West but not really a contributor of 
westernization. This book, produced at a time in which modernization 
theory was quite influential, was critical of structural theories of 
development and democracy. In a nutshell, Huntington argued that 
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structural variables did not suffice. A powerful centralizing 
government which could lead the process of modernity was needed. 
Latin America, as Huntington put it, lacked governments that could 
govern. Thus, strong military rule, in Huntington’s argument, could 
become a modernizing force. Soon we found out the limitation of this 
argument. What is worth commenting upon, however, is Huntington’s 
persuasive, although distorted, picture of Latin America: a region 
characterized by frustrated modernity and incapable of generating 
modern nations.
77  
Other authors using the Modernization Theory paradigm, like 
Myron Wyner and Joseph La Palombara, reinforced this image of 
backward nations and “traditional” national identities. Since it was 
hardly capable of generating modernity of its own, the region seemed 
eager to adopt modernity but show limited progress.
78  Party building 
and party competition, strong signs of modernization and democracy 
for this literature, had spread throughout Latin America. Alex Inkeles 
and David Smith found that in Latin America and other regions the 
individual had conquered the centerpiece of social and political life.
 79  
However, these findings did not fully grant Latin America modern 
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status. Mainly because the engine of modernization rested 
elsewhere, national identity –and, we can assume, conceptualizations 
of the nation—could not really be comparable to those of advanced 
societies. The exercise was, in fact, never seriously attempted.   
Others simply avoided the inclusion of Latin America in their 
comprehensive studies of modernity. David Apter perceptively did so 
in his insightful book Political Change. Yet in his modernization 
classic The Politics of Modernization he does discuss the region but 
his vision is, like that of other modernization literature authors, rather 
fuzzy regarding the capacity of the region to produce modernity or the 
place that it occupied in the West.  Gabriel Almond’s classic Political 
Development pays scarce attention to Latin America per se, but it 
does provide a general overview of the region. In it, its modern 
characteristics are poorly treated or altogether ignored. Not only did 
Latin America seem not to have created any modernity of its own, but 
it also appeared rather unable to quickly adjust to it. And, similar to 
many other “developing societies”, struggled to “adjust” to the 
modernizing impulse coming from the developed countries of the 
world.  
It was in his insightful The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations, that Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba 
did include a case from Latin America offering a specific study of 
public opinion in Mexico.
80 This was a welcoming inclusion of a Latin 
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American country in a wider comparison including cases from both 
the “developing” and developed world. Yet the comparison reveals 
little about the western modern features of that particular civic culture, 
the capacity of the region to generate modernity or, more importantly, 
the incredible cutting edge design of the Mexican nation. 
Institutionally and politically the  choice of Mexico, at the time a one 
party dominant system and a country possessing a very large 
peasantry that  for modernization theory represented an indicator of a 
strong “traditional” society, was certainly not one that would easily 
allow to detect otherwise obvious aspects of modernity.  
The nation and national identity have not been favorites in 
macro and structural analysis. Comparative macro theorizing has 
focused on other issues. Nation building and how to construct its 
conceptualization and/or the “emotional ties” that would connect 
people to institutions and “the nation” have seldom be part of the 
research agenda.  This is a loss because many issues that are the 
focus of macro theorizing cannot be fully explained without a theory 
of modern nation building and national identity. The opposite is also 
true.  Historians have long pioneered macro comprehensive research 
that explored “modern” and global developments in the region.  In 
most of them a discussion of the nation, however, does not rank as a 
priority.
81  Some historians, as Halperin Donghi did with the case of 
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Argentina, showed these nations as modern constructs on their own. 
And so did others. But these interpretations remained in general alien 
to Modernization, World Systems, and Dependency Theory scholars.  
Some macro theories that included Latin America have made 
important comparative contributions and some discussed nation 
building.
82 However, most of this work did not consider Latin America 
as a modernizer, nor did it explore nation building from that 
perspective. Neither have several authors who have comparatively 
taken the problems of nation-state formation to task.
83  Research on 
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the state coming from political science can also be considered a 
contribution to a more serious study of modernity and nation building 
in the region, but the problems of nation building that occupy us here 
or national identity have emerged only randomly in the discussion.
84  
Comparative studies on revolution that include an exploration of 
globalization and modernization do exist, but, again, they have not 
focused on the formation of national identity or on Latin America as a 
modernizer.
85   
One of the major founders of comparative historical sociology, 
Barrington Moore Jr., in his cited opus to the field The Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy…, neither studied nor mentioned the 
region.
86  Moore either attempted to suggest that Latin American 
cases could not contribute anything substantial to the central 
questions of his book, or, most likely, was not interested or 
considered that it was too burdensome to include them. Was the 
region part of his “path” to democracy or a contributor to Communism 
or Fascism? We will never know Moore’s thoughts on this. One 
                                            
84 See, for instance, Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier.  1991.  Shaping the Political 
Arena:  Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America.  
Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press. 
  
85 Work has gone from analyses of the wars of independence to Marxist movements and 
their impact in the twentieth century. See, among others, Humphreys, Robert Arthur, and 
John Lynch( ed)..  The Origins of the Latin American Revolutions, 1808–1826.  New 
York:  Alfred Knopf, 1964; John Foran,  Taking Power: the Origins of Third World 
Revolutions, Cambridge, University Press,   and Jeffrey Paige Coffee and Power: 
Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America, Harvard University Press, 
1998. See also his Agrarian Revolutions: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in 
the Underdeveloped World, The Free Press, New York, McMillan Publishers, 1978. 
     
86  Moore, Barrington Jr. Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modern World. Beacon Press. 1966 
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cannot demand more of Moore’s pioneer work. Yet given the 
comprehensive character of his argument it seems adequate to ask 
what kind of “path” to modernity, if placed in that context, Latin 
America would represent. Indeed, his choice not to include the area 
has propelled some scholars to try to reinterpret Latin America’s 
modernity through Moore’s argument about the commercialization of 
agriculture.
87  Was the region’s “path” characterized by an imperfect 
“adoption” of modernity created elsewhere, or one in which these 
societies contributed something of their own to the construction of 
that Western type of modernity that Moore considers in part 1 of his 
book when comparing England, the United States, and France? This 
key question was, unfortunately, not posed by literature trying to use 
Moore’s argument in Latin America.   
Finally, we come again to culture, but this time as the foremost 
contribution of Latin America to the modern world and the one area in 
which the region does contribute to shape the global system. Latin 
America: not a modernizer or a globalizer but yes a culture producer, 
Indeed, when one looks at the literature, culture seems to be the 
typical Latin American product for export.  In 1999 Huntington, again, 
                                            
87 See, for instance, Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. 
Stephens.  1992.  Capitalist Development and Democracy.  Chicago, IL:  University of 
Chicago Press. In my State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 2000, I 
considered Moore’s argument as well but, in my view, the commercialization of 
agriculture in Latin America did not provoke the same political arrangements that it did in 
Europe, that is, democracy. In fact, in Latin America the commercialization of agriculture 
took place after a number of democratizing reforms were already in place (Colombia, 
Argentina). For a different and critical view of the application of Moore’s argument to 
Chile, see Samuel Valenzuela, “Barrington Moore and the Case of Chile” in Miguel 
Centeno and Fernando Lopez-Alves, (eds.) The Other Mirror: Grand Theory Through 
The Lens of Latin America, Princeton, University Press, 2001.  
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examined Latin America.  In his Clash of Civilizations… The region is 
defined as a “civilization” on its own right; again, geographically in the 
West but representing something else. A sort of Latin American 
culture (or civilization) emerges and plays a part in an ongoing clash 
among different “civilizations”. This “Latin” culture --or civilization-- 
confronts others, including perhaps, although unlikely, the West.  
In this argument the actual role to be played by such “Latin 
American culture” remains blurred, since it seems to participate only 
marginally in the struggles that will characterize the future. While 
Huntington does not talk about national identities or nations, his 
argument reveals that these nations are still different from and not 
comparable to Europe or the United States. In this argument, 
however, the region does acquire the status of actor in a world where 
cultural and religious wars, as opposed to ideological ones, would 
shape the new global system. Since Huntington bestows upon Latin 
America a semi-equal status to other “civilizations”, one can assume 
that the region can become a maker of influence. Yet at the end this 
civilization remains a weak actor.  
Other interpretations of cultural change and globalization have 
also granted Latin America a more important space.
 88 Very much like 
national identity, culture can be taken as the forefront of resistance 
against modernity or globalization. Or it can also be understood as 
                                            
88  There are many books, guides, and approaches to culture in Latin America. See, 
among others, Dwight B. Health Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America: 
A Reader in the Social Anthropology of Middle and South America,, Random House, NY, 
1965. From a different approach and topics, see Saul Sosnoswski, ed. Repression, 
Exile, and Democracy: Uruguayan Culture, Duke University Press, 1993.   
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something that enriches the process of globalization, contributing to 
what has been called “global culture”. Latin America is certainly a 
producer of culture and I cannot think of any other region of the world 
that has not been. What is wrong with this strong emphasis on culture 
is that one gets the impression that culture has become Latin 
America’s only important contribution to modernity or global change.  
Authors have seen different manifestations of “culture” (political 
culture, social culture, communal and solidarity culture, cultures of 
resistance, cultures of rebellion, revolutionary cultures, national 
cultures, reactive cultures, and so forth) as one of the most important 
aspect to be studied about the region in terms of its relation to the 
world and, especially, the core countries.
89 The nation and national 
identity are usually subsumed under this label.  
Culture also seems to emerge from forgotten, wise, and ancient 
traditions that for all their praise have little to contribute to change, 
globalization, or modernity. The construction of trade structures and 
corporate thinking is reserved for other global actors.
90 It is fair to say 
                                            
89 Among others, see most contributions to the collection by Gilbert M. Joseph, 
Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore (ed.),  Close Encounters of Empire: 
Writing the Cultural History of US-Latin American Relations, Duke University Press, 
1998.See also  Wiarda, Howard J. ed. Politics and Social Change in Latin America:  Still 
a Distinct Tradition? Third edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Culture has also 
become a buzzword for many Latin American scholars who have interpreted political 
institutions as a result of special political cultures. See, among others, Gerardo 
Caetano’s work on Uruguayan political culture, a topic that has been a favorite of 
Uruguayan historians and political scientists. John Foran’s  Taking Power: On the 
Origins of Third World Revolutions, op. cit., represents, however, an ambitions 
comparative theory of revolutions that includes Latin America and wisely uses the term 
“culture” as an analytical comparative tool in tandem with other variables.  
              
90 According to a most of the times unspoken consensus, Western Europe and the 
United States (at times Canada) are seen as contributing hard science, economic  
  80 
that, in the world of the 21
st century, Latin America and most of the 
developing world are still seeing as culture exporters (music, art, life 
styles, some movies, soup-operas, food).  As it has been argued, 
however, the region’s crucial contribution to our understanding of the 
consolidation of the modern world and contemporary global change is 
far and beyond “culture” or its experimentation with liberalism and 
neo-liberalism. We will now examine the connection between futures, 
globalization, and national identity. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
development, democracy, modern state institutions, welfare, and an orderly modern 
“political culture”. Latin America, instead, keeps supplying other kinds of art and culture. 